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“We are tired of war. We are tired of running. We are
tired of begging for food. We are tired of our children being raped.
We are now taking this stand to secure the future of our children.
Because we believe, as custodians of society tomorrow, our
children will ask us, mama, what was your role during the crisis?”
— Leymah Gbowee,
on behalf of Liberian women
to Charles Taylor, President of Liberia
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I. Introduction
The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era of international politics,
characterized by a lack of dominant structure and a shifting system of world order. The
number of intrastate conflicts has since increased dramatically, along with their duration
and degree of complexity; as national systems of order break down, dormant antagonisms
and repressed grievances reassert themselves. Especially within the Third World, these
conflicts often threaten regional stability and are accompanied by high rates of civilian
casualties and human rights violations.
The prevalence and virulence of intrastate conflict in recent decades has had
serious implications for women, most notably in that there is no longer a clear distinction
between “the battlefield” and “the home front.” This increase in inclusive violence has
meant that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of
those adversely affected by the conflict. In particular, women often experience a level of
violence—principally sexual violence—and mortality similar to that of male combatants
throughout the course of the conflict. This is because, in many societies, women are
especially vulnerable due to the preexisting gender imbalance in levels of political,
economic and social power. Further, women are often associated with the “virtue” or
identity of a group, making them appealing targets for the opposition who wish to
undermine the ethnic or cultural foundations of a society by raping or shaming their
women.
Because the traumatic effects of civil war are not unique to male combatants, it is
important to recognize the consequent impact this violence has on women—and thus on
durable peace and reconciliation. Often, women are not included in formal efforts to
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resolve conflicts and build peace; however, the participation of women represents a
potential opportunity to bridge seemingly insurmountable divides and also to incorporate
actors from civil society and the family, rather than the battlefield, for the purposes of
creating sustainable peace. Women are often key players in non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), popular protests and other grassroots movements, empowering
them in civil society and allowing them to inspire societal change and support sustainable
peace. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine the ways in which women are incorporated
into, or excluded from, the process of building peace and whether the level of female
involvement can impact the success and longevity of that peace.
While it must be acknowledged that this transition from civil war to stable peace
is inherently complicated and challenging—and no one factor can determine its
success—it is precisely because of the complex nature of peace-building that a stronger
focus on the incorporation of women and their concerns into the process should be
explored. This was acknowledged internationally on October 31st, 2000 in the United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, which codified the expansion of the role of
women in U.N. field-based operations to better respond to the needs of women in postconflict societies and also to provide a more solid foundation for peace. However, the
role of local women in the decision-making process is still marginal, particularly in
formal peace negotiations and also in many of the new political institutions that are
created after civil war. This is despite women’s unique strengths in forming coalitions
across the divides created during civil war and the disproportionate amount of violence
perpetrated against them in the course of conflict.
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Although the effects of civil war on women and their role in post-conflict
societies are the focus of this paper, the diversity of women’s experiences must be
acknowledged. The focus on women’s issues and interests does not imply that women are
a monolithic group; instead, the experiences and opinions of women are multidimensional, depending also on factors such as ethnicity, class and religion. However, the
conditions of war and peace do affect women differently than men, and those differences
are rarely taken into account during the peacebuilding process. Women are also
universally disadvantaged in patriarchal societies, although in different ways and to
different degrees, which contributes to a common pattern of experiences and concerns.
Thus, women should be viewed as a diverse group of social actors with differentiated
backgrounds and capacities that inform their own agendas, which often articulate the
needs of society as a whole in addition to the specific interests of the female population.
In this way, women are capable of substantive contributions to lasting peace in postconflict societies, and should not be relegated to the mere victims or simply the targets of
interventions.
A large body of literature exists that focuses on the effects of peacebuilding on
women, particularly opportunities in post-conflict societies for shifting the gender
paradigm and empowering women. However, little research exists regarding the impact
of women’s participation in the peacebuilding process on the success of peace efforts. To
rectify this oversight, the main research question driving this paper is: what is the impact
of varied degrees of participation by women and women’s organizations during
peacebuilding on the outcome of that process? An exploration of this question is
particularly relevant because the current marginalization of women has led to an
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expectation on the part of important post-conflict actors, both international and domestic,
that proof of women’s contributions must be provided before they should be equally
incorporated into the peacebuilding process.
Before examining the research question proposed above, a review of the existing
literature on peacebuilding will be presented, focusing on four particular functions of
peacebuilding—addressing fear and mistrust, creating democratic political and economic
institutions, supporting reconciliation and fostering civil society—and the mechanisms by
which they contribute to sustained peace. A discussion of the extensive negative effects
of civil war on women will follow. And finally, women’s participation will be linked to
each of the four functions of peacebuilding to demonstrate the plausible ways in which it
can have a causal effect on such efforts, and thereby increase the likelihood that peace
will persist.
To supplement these theoretical arguments, four cases studies from conflicts in
sub-Saharan Africa—representing a range of women’s involvement in peacebuilding—
will be presented: the First Liberian Civil War (1989-1996), the Second Liberian Civil
War (1999-2003), the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1993) and the Rwandan Genocide
(1994). The Rwandan Civil War will present a case in which there was little to no
participation of women and failed peace, while the Rwandan Genocide and Second
Liberian Civil War will illustrate the peace successes following substantive participation
by women and women’s organizations. The First Liberian Civil War will define the
parameters of the argument, as there existed a strong woman’s movement but violence
resumed despite peacebuilding efforts. Ultimately, this paper will demonstrate that
although a substantial level of participation on the part of women cannot be seen as the
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deciding factor in achieving lasting peace, significant women’s participation—
particularly in both civil society and in the formal government—can have a positive
impact on peacebuilding efforts.

II. Literature Review, Part I: Theoretical Perspectives on
Peace-Building
Prior to discussing the specific role of women in the peace-building process, the
main factors preventing the attainment of long-term peace must be elucidated and the
mechanisms for reducing those factors identified. First, peacebuilding must be defined
and differentiated from peacemaking and peacekeeping. “Peacemaking” generally refers
to the signing of agreements between policymakers, which results in a suspension of
fighting. For the United Nation, peacemaking involves bringing hostile parties to
agreement through diplomatic means, most commonly through negotiation.1 However,
this peace is often tenuous, and the formal signing of a peace agreement does not
guarantee that violence will not resume. Thus, “peacekeeping” often occurs during these
interludes: peacekeeping refers to the deployment of international personnel to maintain
peace and security. Peacekeeping is generally a multilateral activity, and all of these
missions involve military personnel, although many include substantial civilian
components as well.2 The functions of peacekeepers are broad and may encompass the

1

United Nations, “The UN in Brief: What the UN Does for Peace: Peacemaking,” available at
<http://www.un.org/Overview/uninbrief/peacemaking.shtml>.
2
Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 5.
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observation of a ceasefire, the establishment of a buffer zone and the organization of
elections.3
While certainly peacemaking, and often peacekeeping, are integral to successful
peacebuilding, they represent narrower and generally shorter commitments. In contrast,
peacebuilding refers to a long-term commitment that includes post-conflict
reconstruction, but also involves a wide array of processes and stages necessary to
transform a conflict toward more sustainable peace.4 To simplify, “peacemaking” aims to
bring about a cessation in hostilities and allow the combatants to pursue nonviolent
solutions; “peacekeeping” attempts to separate the disputing parties and maintain a state
of non-violence; finally, “peacebuilding” is a process that establishes the conditions for a
sustainable settlement.5
Thus, the major purpose of peacebuilding, as defined by Bercovitch and
Kadayifici (2002), is the prevention of a relapse into violent conflict. To achieve this,
peacebuilding goes beyond diplomatic agreements to promote social and psychological
change at the grassroots level.6 Because enacting such change involves an inherently
lengthy and complex process, peacebuilding can be seen as including three inter-related
elements: the effective intervention by external actors to create the conditions conducive
to peace; the relief and reconstruction of war-torn society; and the creation of political

3

United Nations, “The UN in Brief: What the UN Does for Peace: Peacekeeping,” available at
<http://www.un.org/Overview/uninbrief/peacemaking.shtml >.
4
John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, (Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), p. 17-18.
5
Jacob Bercovitch and Ayse Kadayifci, “Exploring the Relevance and Contribution of Mediation to PeaceBuilding,” in Peace and Conflict Studies 9, no. 2: (2002), p. 21-22.
6
Ibid, p. 23.
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and socio-economic institutions to build trust and to create a sense of security.7 Further,
for the purposes of this paper, “peacebuilders” will refer to any actors that are working to
achieve these goals: including, but not limited to, formal interventions, state
governments, local and international NGOs, civil society groups and individuals. This is
an important classification because peacebuilding can take place at the group, community
or state level.8
The process of peacebuilding may begin while the conflict is ongoing, and the
transitional period of negative peace—or an absence of violence—may last for many
years until positive peace—or a condition of enduring stability—is reached. Because
successful peacebuilding engages with a broad set of challenges, ranging from ending the
physical fighting and disarming the warring factions to establishing economic stability
and building a sense of community, there exists a vast literature on the topic. However,
this paper will focus on three main functions of peacebuilding and the associated issues
that must be resolved to attain durable peace. These main functions are: (1) addressing
fear and mistrust and preventing a return to aggression, (2) rebuilding political and
economic institutions and remedying political exclusion, and (3) fostering social
reconciliation and strengthening civil society.
While the specifics of these objectives will vary depending on the conflict and the
capacity of the intervention—taken together, they attempt to institutionalize peace and
prevent a return to violence. Although the scope of this paper allows for only a brief

7

James Bumsumtwi-Sam, “Development and Peacebuilding: Conceptual and Operational Deficits in
International Assistance” in Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding Africa, eds. Taisier M. Ali and
Robert O. Matthews, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), p. 315.
8
John Galtung, “Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding” in Peace,
War, and Defense—Essays in Peace Research, vol 2, ed. John Galtang, (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers,
1975), p. 282-302.
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discussion of the functions of peacebuilding, the following section will demonstrate why
each function must necessarily be served in the aftermath of civil war and how that
contributes to a stable foundation for peace and fosters cooperation and trust between
previously warring factions.

1. Addressing Fear and Mistrust
Following a cessation of violence, strong incentives for aggression still remain on
both sides of the conflict. As Fortna (2008) notes, both factions know the other side has
“at least partially aggressive motives” and so, without the ability to monitor their own
agreements effectively, a deeply ingrained suspicion of the enemy persists.9 These
situations make spirals into the security dilemma extremely likely. Thus, successful
peacebuilding necessitates preventing a return to violence in the short-term, facilitating
the monitoring of agreements, and fostering trust between combatants. These issues are
often addressed through initial peacekeeping interventions, which raise the costs of war
or the benefits of peace—thereby reducing the likelihood of aggression—and which aid
in monitoring and so disrupt the security dilemma by reducing belligerents’ uncertainty.10
This aspect of peacebuilding also includes demobilizing and integrating forces and
institutionalizing mechanisms for peaceful dispute resolution and political change.11 By
creating a secure environment, these activities are linked to peacebuilding’s main
objectives: to prevent armed conflict and to manage peace in post-conflict societies.
In many cases of intrastate conflict, tenuous periods of peace are threatened by the
presence of spoilers. Therefore, successful peacebuilding efforts must mitigate the
9

Fortna, p. 84.
Ibid., p. 86.
11
Bumsumtwi-Sam, p. 328
10
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harmful effects of these actors, whether groups or individuals, that seek to hinder, delay
or undermine conflict settlement.12 In his work on spoilers, Stedman (1997) identifies
numerous strategies for peacebuilders, as international actors, to employ when managing
spoilers—such as inducement, the addressing of grievances for those factions who
obstruct peace, or socialization, which involves establishing a set of norms for acceptable
behavior by internal parties that can then be used to judge the behavior of those parties.13
This requires correctly identifying both the type of spoiler and their motives and
effectively undertaking the appropriate strategy; regardless of these challenges,
successful peacemaking—and thus peacebuilding—requires acknowledging and
addressing spoilers to prevent a return to violence.

2. Rebuilding Inclusive Political and Economic Institutions
As broadly discussed above, the processes of peacebuilding must necessarily
address issues of fear and mistrust, particularly in the short term, to create a stable
foundation for peace and to foster cooperation between previously warring factions.
However, peacebuilding differs from peacemaking and peacekeeping in its long-term
development goals, such as rebuilding or creating political and economic institutions.
Following an instrastate conflict, there is often destruction of physical infrastructure as
well as economic disruption and political instability. Therefore, peacebuilding must
establish the foundations for the reconstruction of the state, encourage regime legitimacy
and inclusive political arrangements, and restore the administrative and enforcement
12

Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, “Introduction. Obstacles to Peace Processes: Understanding
Spoiling,” in Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution, eds. Newman
and Richmond (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006), p. 1
13
Stephan J. Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” in International Security 22, no.2: (Fall
1997): p. 12 -13.

Mary McCarthy | 14

capacities of the state. By doing so, peacebuilding creates a more stable and responsive
form of political and economic relations within the state—and so allows grievances to be
dealt with directly and without a resort to violence in the future.
Ali and Matthews (2004) offer a list of political and economic redevelopment
goals; politically, they suggest establishing the spatial and functional foundations for the
reconstitution of state authority, foster regime legitimacy, and restore the administrative
and enforcement capacities of the state. Economically, they advise establishing the
foundations of a working economy, restoring a degree of macroeconomic stability,
generating opportunities for employment and creating clear targets for reducing poverty
and inequality.14 These economic imperatives are necessary to address underlying
inequality and high rates of unemployment, which can be exploited by either side to
encourage a resumption of war. While not exhaustive, this list illustrates the long-term,
multi-dimensional nature of peacebuilding. These goals are essential to establishing a
stable peace and remedying the underlying cause of conflict—without political and
economic opportunities, a relapse into violence is substantially more likely.
The creation of inclusive political and economic institutions is particularly
pertinent as exclusion from these realms is often a driving force behind conflict; if these
inequalities persist, then one or both sides will retain a strong motivation for the return to
violence. Further, as Fortna (2008) notes, the governance structure must be one that both
sides can tolerate, otherwise former combatants may return to war if they feel they are
losing the peace politically. Peacebuilding can directly contribute to this by monitoring or
running elections, reestablishing institutions of law and order, monitoring human rights

14

Bumsumtwi-Sam, p. 325-334.
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and rebuilding state institutions among other functions.15 In addition, military parties
must be transformed through this process into political organizations that can participate
in legitimate elections. All of these undertakings help to progress the conflict “from the
battlefield to more peaceful institutions of dispute settlements” by allowing all members
of society to participate fully in civil and economic life.16
To accomplish these goals, peacebuilding often works towards establishing stable
and democratic institutions to mediate competing domestic interests in the long term.
Because democratic societies are participatory and more transparent than other regime
types, they facilitate the building of trust and cooperation in post-conflict societies. In
their research on 124 civil wars and peacebuilding outcomes since 1994, Doyle and
Sambanis (2006) found a positive correlation between United Nations peace operations
and democratization after civil war, which contribute to continuing peace.17 Research has
also shown that democracies are more effective at defusing violent conflict than
dictatorships, which experience a war every twelve years on average as compared to
every twenty-one years for democracies.18 These finding corroborate the democratic
peace theory, which states that democracies are less likely to enter into conflict due to the
moderating effect of democratic norms and the inherent checks and balances on domestic
power, particularly constraining the powers of the executive. Further, democratic
elections foster peaceful political competition and allow for bloodless power transitions
within the state.

15

Fortna, p. 98-99
Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace
Operations, ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 15.
17
Ibid, p. 114.
18
Adam Przeworski, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World,
1950-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 36.
16
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However, Mansfield and Snyder (1995) note that, while mature democracies are
more stable and safer, states often go through a “rocky transition” to reach democracy
and can become more aggressive and war-prone during that period.19 This finding does
not undermine the significance of creating inclusive, democratic institutions during postconflict reconstruction; conversely, it demonstrates the need for skillful peacebuilding to
ensure, for example, that elections are transparent or that economic opportunities are
equally available to prevent the disintegration of democratic progress and a return to
violence. By rebuilding political and economic institutions and reconstituting them to
promote equality and democracy, peacebuilding thus remedies many of the root causes of
conflict and contributes to a long-term peace.

3. Reconciliation
Following conflict, the importance of reconciliation and healing is evident: most
survivors of violence show symptomatic responses, and the impact of large-scale
violence can create deep rifts within families and communities.20 When issues of
victimization and justice are not addressed, resentment can foster and previous
antagonisms can easily be reignited. Further, reconciliation diminishes discrimination and
conditions people to not normalize violent attacks on others. As such, many studies in
post-conflict reconstruction regard reconciliation and restoring relations on the ground as

19

Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War” in Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3: (1995), p.
79-80.
20
Brandon Hamber, Transforming Societies After Political Violence: Truth, Reconciliation and Mental
Health, (New York: Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 2009, p. 19.
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vital to preventing future violence.21 To remedy this, formal reconciliation may occur
through International Criminal Courts or domestic trials and community-based courts, as
in the case of Rwanda.
However, reconciliation may happen more informally, through fostering feelings
of ownership in the process of institution-building—which creates a sense of
identification with the greater whole.22 The process of acknowledging the atrocities of
war and creating a mutual narrative prevents either side from co-opting past violence to
inspire new conflict, as citizens are less likely to respond to agendas of suspicion; further,
the process of reconciliation addresses the psychological needs of the population and lays
the foundation for a feeling of physical and mental security. This type of “social
reconciliation” can be accomplished by establishing dialogue between victims and
perpetrators, articulating the truth of the events that unfolded in the course of war,
promoting understand and forgiveness and ultimately healing—all of which are integral
parts of the peacebuilding agenda.23 Further, peacebuilding can create a system of justice
for crimes committed during war, encompassing trials, payment of compensation or the
acknowledgement of responsibility by the perpetrator.24 This encourages respect for the
rule of law and can be psychologically necessary for communities ravaged by war.
Ultimately, reconciliation represents an opportunity to engage with the past, enact
significant changes in attitudes and build positive relationships for a stable, peaceful
future—it is both constructive and transformative.
21

Elham Atashi, “Challenges to Conflict Transformation from the Streets” in Conflict Transformation and
Peacebuilding: Moving from Violence to Sustainable Peace, eds. Bruce Dayton and Louis Kriesberg,
(London: Routledge, 2009), p 55.
22
Jarat Chopra and Tanja Hohe, “Participatory Peacebuilding” in Building Sustainable Peace, eds. Tom
Keating and W. Andy Knight, (Alberta: University of Alberta Press, 2004), p. 245-246.
23
Timothy Murithi, The Ethics of Peacebuilding, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p.138
24
Hizkias Assefa, “Reconciliation” in Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, eds. L. Reychler and T. Paffenholz,
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), p. 336-342.
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4. Fostering Civil Society
While the above factors are all necessary components of peacebuilding, such
undertakings are generally instituted from above. However, sustainable peace requires
top-down and bottom-up approaches to ensure investment from the entire society.
Therefore, the rehabilitation and growth of civil society following a conflict is also an
integral aspect of long-term peace and stability. While the definition of civil society is
fluid, it generally refers to a “sphere of voluntary action that is distinct from the state,
political, private and economic spheres, though civil society is oriented toward and
interacts closely with them.”25 Therefore, civil society should be regarded as extending
beyond family or clan affiliations but separate from the state and the market. Within this
sphere, voluntary organizations and associations undertake collective action and serve a
variety of essential functions.
Civil society contributes significantly to each of the peacebuilding objectives
described above, in addition to independently promoting sustainable peace. In the period
directly following a ceasefire, local civic groups can monitor the conflict situation on the
ground and provide information to decision-makers, reducing uncertainty regarding the
other side’s intentions.26 In relation to civil society fostering trust and reducing
aggression, Varshney (2003) observed that varying levels of violence between Hindus
and Muslims in similar settings could be explained by the strength of associational

25

Christoph Spurk, “Understanding Civil Society” in Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical
Assessment, ed. Thania Paffenholz, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), p. 9.
26
Thania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk, “A Comprehensive Analytical Framework” in Civil Society and
Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment, ed. Thania Paffenholz, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2010), p. 68.
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networks and everyday forms of civic engagement.27 Associational networks include
business associations, professional organizations, trade unions, and festival organizations
among others, while everyday engagement refers to routine interactions, such as families
visiting each other or participating together in festivals.28
These interactions, in the realm of civil society, promote communication between
members of different communities and allow for tensions to be regulated at the local
level. Thus, by fostering interaction between previously hostile groups, the two
communities can form organizations that serve their communal economic, social and
cultural needs—increasing the incentives for continued peace and laying the foundation
for the formation of temporary organizations in times of tension to manage rising
conflict.29 Varshney also noted that such civic networks constrain the behavior of local
politicians and minimize their ability to use polarization for the sake of electoral
advantage.30 Overall, participation in social organizations helps to bridge social cleavages
and to foster social cohesion.31 By bringing together members of former conflict groups,
including for business or development work, civil society provides a space in which
peaceful behaviors and norms can be learned and creates beneficial cooperatives that alter
each group’s incentives for returning to violence.
In terms of the vibrancy of a country’s democratic institutions, civil society is a
vital source of social capital that enables participants to work together more effectively to

27

Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).
Ibid., p. 3.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid., p. 11-12.
31
Spurk, p. 21.
28
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pursue shared objectives.32 As heterogeneous groups discover that bonds of trust and
solidarity enable them to better achieve their goals, social peace and civility are thus
promoted. Because of the voluntary nature of civil society, it functions as a free space in
which “democratic attitudes are cultivated and democratic behavior is conditioned:”
through involvement in civil society, citizens are able to learn about fundamental
democratic values, such as participation and collective action.33 In this way, civil society
indirectly promotes democracy, while organizations within the sphere can also directly
articulate a pro-democracy agenda and extend that idea throughout society—educating
others about democracy and mobilizing others for the cause. Advocacy on the part of
civil society, particularly for peace, creates public pressure to maintain diplomatic
agreements. This advocacy also allows civil society groups to place values such as human
rights and democratic values on the political agenda.34
Civic engagement, therefore, creates dense, overlapping networks that are
autonomous from the political regime but can still exert a profound influence in the
political sphere. Particularly in times of transition, civil society can balance the power of
the state, as it is beyond the direct control of the government, and protect the interests of
citizens. The strength of civic culture has also been shown as the best predictor of
economic vitality, because the solidarity of such organizations allows them to respond to
challenges more effectively—thus, civil society promotes both economic cooperation and

32
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development.35 By creating a forum for citizens to peacefully pursue a variety of shared
interests, civil society contributes to the solidification and dissemination of democratic
values, prevents abuses by the state, and enables economic vitality.
Additionally, civil society can promote post-conflict reconciliation through a
variety of mechanisms. Because it functions separately from the state, civic groups can
promote alternatives ways of attaining justice even when the official policy emphasizes
punishment—which may not be the most appropriate mechanism for achieving long-term
healing.36 Civil society can also create momentum for reconciliation at the grassroots
level, both when formal reconciliation is not undertaken or when it is enacted in a topdown manner. In particular, prominent members of society can demonstrate the value of
reconciliation through symbolic, public acts of forgiveness. Civic organizations are also
able to facilitate the empowerment of marginalized groups, ensuring that their needs are
addressed and that they are incorporated into the reconciliation process.37 Finally, as
previously discussed, the collaborative nature of civil society itself helps to foster
positive relationships between polarized groups and to promote constructive dialogue. In
this way, civil society becomes part of a “wider process of changing societal relations and
injustices to prevent harm in the future.”38
Considering civil society’s contributions to these three functions of peacebuilding,
numerous studies over the past decade have concluded that only the involvement of
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multiple actors, including those in civil society, can lead to sustainable peace.39 The
cooperation of civic organization has many benefits for peacebuilders, as these groups
have the comparative advantage of local knowledge and an intuitive grasp of both the
barriers to and opportunities for peace at the local level when compared to international
or top-down initiatives.40 In addition, civil society is often perceived as a neutral force,
which can de-politicize peacebuilding, adding to the legitimacy of such undertakings.41
Grassroots organizations also enjoy a greater degree of flexibility than governments or
formal interventions and can more easily promote local participation because they are
embedded in the community. Thus, peacebuilding’s direct support for civil society, such
as through legislative initiatives or reforms to remove governmental obstacles to civic
engagement, facilitates positive peace outcomes by creating a space for such
associational networks. Further, peacebuilding initiatives often provide resources or new
technology to civic organizations and create the necessary conditions of security and
openness for civil society to flourish.42 In this way, the synergistic effects of civil society
can also support and amplify the other objectives of peacebuilding, all of which function
as mechanisms for the promotion of sustainable peace.
Ultimately, peacebuilding is a dynamic process of resolving conflict and
rebuilding society: it refers to a wide variety of activities and methods of intervention
aimed at bring about sustainable peace. More so than peacemaking or peacekeeping, it
strengthens the capacity of society to manage change non-violently and addresses the root

39

Thania Paffenholz, “Peacebuilding: A Comprehensive Learning Process” in Peacebuilding: A Field
Guide, eds. L. Reychler and T. Paffenholz, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), p. 535-538.
40
Van Leeuwen, p. 38.
41
Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security,
(London, New York: Zed Books, 2001).
42
Barber, p. 26.

Mary McCarthy | 23

cause of the conflict through long-term reconstruction and reconciliation. Further, while
peacebuilding includes formal interventions, it also encompasses unofficial actors in the
realm of civil society and local resolution efforts that provide grassroots support for
official policies.

III. Literature Review, Part II: A Causal Theory of Women as
Effective Peace-Builders
Peacebuilding is a markedly complex undertaking, which involves a multitude of
diverse actors—including women. While much of the existing literature on women’s
involvement with attaining and maintaining peace discusses the possible roles of women
in peacebuilding, such as grassroots organizing or involvement in reconciliation, it does
not present an explicit casual explanation for how their participation keeps war from
resuming in the long run. In the following section, this paper will attempt to link the
functions of women in peacebuilding to a casual theory of how that participation fosters
sustainable peace by addressing the general issues encountered by peace-builders
outlined above. Because peacebuilding is a lengthy and complex process, only a limited
claim can be made for the independent effect of women’s participation resulting in a
successful peace outcome; however, there are several plausible ways in which the
substantive participation of women might constructively contribute to the prospects for
peace.
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Women and Civil War:
First, however, a brief discussion of the effects of civil war on women and the
foundations of their marginalization during peacebuilding must be undertaken. There are
numerous arguments within feminist literature regarding the reasons why women are so
often marginalized in this process: these arguments frequently highlight the association of
women with the domestic sphere and maternity, and thus the pressure exerted on them to
return to the home and reinstate a degree of “normalcy” following a protracted conflict.
As Haleh Afshar (2003) argues, historical constructions of nationhood and
nationalism often rest on masculine foundations—particularly in post-colonial societies—
and so these ideologies are not necessarily altered during conflict but “are simply
suspended.”43 These salient norms, formed over the course of historical processes, help to
explain why women are often excluded from the peace process despite the impact of the
conflict on their well-being. Further, after conflict has decimated a population, women
may be pressured to fulfill their role as mothers by helping to rebuild the nation through
childbearing. Control over women in the domestic sphere can become regarded as
necessary to “protect, revive and create the nation.”44
In addition, many feminist critiques have demonstrated that the international
community is patriarchal in its approach to post-conflict transition and peacebuilding, in
both the composition of international organizations, including the United Nations, and in
the community’s approach to negotiations and DDR proceedings. The narrow legal
categories constructed by the United Nations in relation to violations during intrastate
conflict often do not incorporate violence against women—as such, these violations are
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excluded from the narrative of the conflict to the detriment of the country’s women.45
Thus, although international actors may not be explicitly patriarchal, they can still
perpetuate detrimental norms and contribute to the construction of a narrative of the
conflict that may marginalize the role played by women both during and after.
To remedy this, the international community has undertaken a goal of gender
mainstreaming, which is defined as:
“… the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned
action, including legislation, policies or programs, in all areas and at all levels. It is a
strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral
dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and
programs in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit
equally and inequality is not perpetuated”46 (United Nations, 2002).
Gender mainstreaming is particularly significant in its application to conflict
transformation, as it is increasingly recognized at both the international and domestic
level that women and men do not experience conflict in the same way and have different
needs and priorities in the aftermath.47 Most notably, women are often excluded from the
initial decision to engage in conflict, but are then disproportionately affected by its
consequences. In contemporary civil wars, civilians—particularly women— have
increasingly become the victims of violence.
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Women are especially vulnerable to rape and sexual violence, which are used as
strategic weapons to humiliate the other side and threaten the existence of ethnic
groups.48 It is difficult to gather data for all conflicts regarding the extent of sexual
violence against women, but—for example—during the 1994 Rwandan genocide,
between 250,000 and 500,000 women are thought to have been raped.49 The Organization
of Africa Unity’s International Panel of Experts (OAU/IPEP) found that “practically
every female over the age of 12 who survived the genocide was raped” during the course
of conflict.50 Tutsi women were particularly vulnerable, because rape was used as a
deliberate weapon to target women in their procreative role and to destroy the purity of
their ethnic group. As abortion is illegal in Rwanda, the National Population Office
estimates that between 2000 and 2500 unwanted pregnancies occurred from these
rapes—leaving women with the lifelong responsibility of bearing and caring for their
rapists’ children.51 Not only did such widespread sexual violence result in profound
physical and psychological trauma, but the HIV prevalence rate in Rwanda also
dramatically increased from 1 percent prior to the conflict in 1994 to 11 percent by 1997,
with higher rates still persisting among women (at 11.3 percent) rather than men (at 10.8
percent).52
Beyond undermining the cultural identity of the women and their ethnic groups,
collective rape functions as an assertion of masculinity and can strengthen the sense of
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loyalty within groups of male fighters.53 Also, many women experience violence within
the home during conflict, as incidences of domestic violence increase during civil war—
with domination becoming the norm and displaced males compensating for feelings of
impotence in the public sphere.54 Women are also more likely than men during a civil
war to be displaced, experience food insecurity and to lose traditional social networks.55
For instance, in both the Rwandan and Liberian conflicts, half of each state’s population
was uprooted—and women and children generally account for 80 percent of the refugees
in such African refugee populations.56 Women are particularly vulnerable to rape during
flight and in refugee camps, in which the special needs of women rarely receive attention.
Further, such massive displacement has deep psychological effects, as it is a traumatic
experience, with women feeling increasingly isolated while still shouldering the burden
of providing for themselves and their dependants without the aid of former social
networks.
While women are generally the victims during conflict, their condition should not
be misconstrued as one of passivity. Because of the extreme circumstances in which they
are placed, women often adopted proactive strategies to ensure their survival and to
provide for their families. Further, women do not always retain their civilian status during
these wars—they are increasingly likely to participate either as combatants or as women
associated with fighting forces (WAFF), who provide logistical and economic support for
the fighters. For example, it is estimated that between 25,000 and 30,000 women
53
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participated in the Liberian conflict in one of these capacities.57 The motivations behind
this participation: women and girls are sometimes abducted and forced to join in the
conflict. In these cases, they are frequently responsible for finding food and water,
preparing meals, cleaning the camp and other forms of logistical support.58 Often, these
women and girls become economically and socially dependent on the armed forces for
their livelihood—making it important to consider their needs during the DDR process.
Armed forces also abducted women and girls to serve as sexual slaves or to force them
into “bush” marriages. However, some women voluntarily provide logistical support or
aid groups by raising money and providing resources.
In addition, some women adopt an active role—serving on the front lines of the
conflict. Their reasons for doing so often include “protecting themselves from sexual
violence, avenging the death of family members, because of peer pressure, or for material
gain and for survival.”59 Frequently, women find the experience empowering, as they
acquire skills such as basic literacy, organization, leadership, map reading and
negotiations.60 Thus, women are not inherently peaceful—they too have the potential for
violence and are capable of participating alongside male combatants in brutal conflict.
However, women are still more likely to use the skills and networks they developed
during conflict to promote reintegration in the aftermath, pushing for peace from within
their movements.61
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As has been briefly demonstrated, women are increasingly affected by civil wars;
however, even with the official policy of gender mainstreaming, they are often not
empowered to express their experiences or to voice their demands in the aftermath. This
exclusion persists despite many women’s strong commitment to ending violence and
maintaining long-term peace, which makes them “highly motivated and able stakeholders
for peacebuilding,” who are nonetheless frequently marginalized during the process.62

1. Women and Peacebuilding:
Having explored the effects of civil war on women and some of the reasons why
women are often not meaningfully included in the peace process, this next section will
present a causal theory of how women’s participation in peacebuilding can contribute to
sustainable peace. However, it must be quickly noted that, in addition to the potential for
women to contribute to successful peace outcomes, their participation should also be
encouraged on the basis of fairness and justice. In countries afflicted by civil war, women
account for half the population and so should comprise half the decision-makers; further,
women are greatly victimized during the conflict and thus deserve to be heard.63
Regardless, assessing the potential of women’s participation to contribute to
lasting peace is especially important due to the likelihood of a resumption of war despite
peacebuilding efforts. For instance, Fortna (2008) examines 94 cease-fires in almost 60
civil wars in the post-Cold War period through 1999, finding that war resumes within a
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year in almost a third of the cases and within five years in over half.64 Because peace is
so fragile in the aftermath of civil war, any factors that can contribute to is sustainability
should be identified and understood—although no one factor is independently responsible
for a positive outcome. Currently, there exists a large body of literature on the
relationship of women to civil war and post-war reconstruction; however, the majority of
these studies focus on the functions of women in the aftermath or the effects that
peacebuilding has on women, rather than linking women’s participation to a causal
theory of how that participation works to prevent a relapse into conflict. This next section
will attempt to address this dearth of causal arguments by suggesting a number of
plausible ways in which women’s participation can contribute to the four functions of
peacebuilding described above in a way that makes peace more likely to last.

i. Addressing Fear and Mistrust
Following protracted conflict, the warring factions retain incentives for aggression
and a relapse into violence is possible when the other side’s intentions are unknown.
Peacebuilding attempts to address this insecurity and prevent a return to violence through
various avenues, as discussed above, and women can directly contribute to many of these
efforts in a variety of ways. For instance, women’s groups often run workshops that
require members of opposing parties to work together, creating a forum for cooperation.65
Further, women’s organizations and individual women are more suited to meeting with
the enemy without arousing suspicion, helping to foster trust—which can be sustained
even when tension arises or peace talks stall. Because women are less implicated during
64
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conflict, anecdotal evidence suggests that they are at least perceived to be more
trustworthy in the aftermath by all parties.66 Women are thought to undertake peace
initiatives on behalf of their communities, rather than for personal gain; this perception of
neutrality and their willingness to engage with both sides allow women the opportunity to
monitor warring factions on the ground and to engage them in meaningful dialogue,
helping to reduce fears and uncertainty.
While working towards a cessation in violence and even afterwards, the presence of
women at negotiations may also facilitate more productive, less aggressive interactions.
Unlike the competing sides, women have fewer reasons to view negotiations as a zerosum game; their presence may therefore temper hostility and promote a focus on the
opportunity to better society, rather than on amassing the maximum amount of power.67
These observations are supported psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen who has conducted
years of empirical research on the differences in communication styles between males
and females: he found that women are “more likely to express anger less directly and to
propose compromises more often,” which can lead to less confrontational exchange.68
Another key aspect of peacebuilding is the implementation of disarmament,
demoblization and reintegration (DDR), which lowers the probability of a security
dilemma by removing weapons from both sides and prevents a relapse to violence by
integrating both forces back into society. Women play an integral role in this long-term
process, as they often take on the task of “support, reintegrating and rehabilitating former
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combatants,” because no other parties are able or interested.69 Women do so by providing
physical assistance and temporary housing, caring for child soldiers and offering
counseling. Further, combatants are frequently more willing to surrender weapons to
women—as a part of the informal community—rather than official organizations because
they want to avoid accusations of hiding illegal weapons.70 Women are generally
cognizant that, if peace fails, they will be unarmed and again vulnerable to extreme
violence—thus, they are invested in successful DDR implementation.
In addition, women also have unique leverage in their roles as wives and mothers for
fostering trust and creating new norms of acceptance and peace. Often women have
loyalties to different kin groups due to local marriage customs, as in the case of Tutsi
women married to Hutu men and vice versa in Rwanda; in the aftermath of conflict, this
can increase their bargaining power and place them in a position to put pressure on their
husbands or sons to seek more peaceful solutions to conflict.71 Such pressure may
convince men to turn in their weapons or simply to engage with the other side in a less
contentious manner. Many women’s organizations also promote peace education for
women, to encourage awareness of the cultural values they convey to their children
through everyday interactions—and how these “may contribute to discriminatory and
violent behavior.”72 Through this education, women can adopt alternative forms of
socialization and so promote trust and non-violent ways of dealing with conflict.
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Finally, depending on the conflict, women are also vital as participants in DDR
programs. For conflicts in which many women participated as fights or provided
community-based supports to the armed factions, their reintegration is equally important
to ensuring peace. When these women are not incorporated into the program, they can
continue to maintain groups by working at their camps, producing food and caring for the
injured. Thus, without women and girls, the camps and fighters would not function
effectively; their exclusion from the DDR process allows groups to remobilize more
efficiently—keeping the potential security threat high.73 Further, women themselves can
act as spoilers: the commitment of women who voluntary joined opposition movements
cannot be underestimated.74 Women can often be reluctant to surrender their weapons,
particularly those coming from societies in which they are heavily discriminated against.
For these women, a weapon can function as a “direct source of respect, empowerment
and protection.”75 Therefore, it is essential to ensure that their particular needs are
addressed and that female combatants are also disarmed and reintegrated into the
society—building trust on both sides.
Overall, individual women, as well as women’s organizations, adopt a variety of
strategies for reducing fear and uncertainty following conflict and fostering an
environment of trust and collaboration. While not exhaustive, the above discussion
indicates that there are many avenues through which these efforts—or women’s inclusion
in the DDR process—can bolster peacebuilding initiatives and so contribute to a positive
peace outcome.
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ii. Rebuilding Political and Economic Institutions
Peacebuilding also necessarily involves rebuilding or reconstituting political and
economic institutions in an inclusive manner and promoting democratization, through
mechanisms such as fair elections and increased popular participation. These long-term
undertakings help to develop a stable society that is able to deal with competing interests
in a non-violent manner. In this realm, the participation of women is particularly vital—
not in the least because women constitute half of every population, and so their full and
fair participation is necessary for a functional democracy. In terms of political
institutions, women play a multi-faceted role in both the formal and informal spheres.
Informally, women’s organizations frequently influence the political agenda; however,
these initiatives are often undertaken in the realm of civil society and so will be discussed
in a subsequent section.
Formally, women who adopt positions of political leadership provide a direct
alternative to traditional political actors, adding to the post-conflict impetus of change. As
mentioned above, women are generally less responsible for atrocities committed during
war and so both their political colleagues and the public at large may trust them more in
leadership positions. Women candidates are also perceived as more honest, as they have
been found less likely to engage in corruption or questionable activities that could tarnish
their credibility—this restraint is often credited to the greater degree of scrutiny on
women in political positions and the harsher repercussions they would face after having
been perceived as symbols of trust.76
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As political actors, women often use their gender identities and common social
experiences to bridge divides, providing an example for other politicians to work across
party lines. Particularly because women remain a minority in the political realm, they
have greater incentives to work as a collective and also to reach out to male candidates
regardless of affiliations.77 Women’s propensity towards inclusion can also be explained
as a result of their own experiences of discrimination or exclusion, which often motivate
female candidates to seek office. As such, they are more inclined to collaborate and work
towards consensus or compromise—contributing to peacebuilding’s paramount goal of
eliminating political exclusion. The greater participation of women in politics also
implicitly promotes moderation as it creates a political body more representative of the
population, drawing in a previously marginalized group and broadening the agenda of
issues to be discussed.78 More so than men, women politicians tend to exhibit a greater
sense of responsibility to their constituents and so lobby for issues ranging from access to
land and education to gender discrimination and sexual violence.79 Overall, women in the
formal political sphere contribute to peace outcomes by promoting collaboration—and
thus minimizing political exclusion as a motivation for returning to war—and by
contributing to a more trustworthy, responsive government which bolsters the state’s
legitimacy among the populace and provides a foundation for democratization.
Women can also participate in rebuilding the economic institutions of a post-war
state. In doing so, they contribute to economic stability and growth, and so raise
incentives for both sides to continue peaceable relations. Although in many countries
women are excluded from the formal sector of the economy, they contribute significantly
77

Anderlini, p. 139.
Ibid., p. 137-138.
79
Ibid., p. 78.
78

Mary McCarthy | 36

in terms of both agriculture and the informal sector. During conflict and afterwards,
women often become responsible for men’s traditional roles, allowing them to learn new
entrepreneurial skills and also to assert themselves in new economic realms.80 After
violence has ceased, women still remain primarily responsible for providing for
dependants, as frequently their male relatives have either been killed or imprisoned
during the fighting. Thus, the revitalization of the economy—particularly as the local
level—falls to women who must support themselves and their families.
To accomplish this, women have proven adept at establishing new networks based
on kinship or locality to work collectively towards restoring their livelihoods.81 By
resuming agricultural production and contributing to informal sector activities, such as
petty trade or work in small-scale businesses, women capitalize on income-generating
opportunities that can lead to expansion in both these areas.82 While often marginalized
from employment in the formal sector due to a lack of education or domestic
responsibility, women still constructively contribute to the reformation of the economy at
the grassroots level. Further, by providing for their families and dependants—including
former soldiers and returned refugees—women contribute the economic recovery of their
families and the revitalization of the economy overall. These efforts increase post-war
stability and decrease the likelihood that men will revert to life as a soldier due to an
inability to support themselves economically.
Thus, women’s participation in the political and economic realm can contribute to
sustainable peace through multiple pathways, which often overlap and reinforce each
80
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other. Most noticeably, they increase the inclusivity of political institutions and also
contribute to economic stability and growth—both of which alter the incentives for
returning to war and provide a solid foundation for continued democratization.

iii. Reconciliation
In post-war societies there exists a psychological and social need for reconciliation
through addressing the needs of victims and creating avenues of accountability and
healing. Peacebuilding involves both formal reconciliation, such as seeking justice in the
courts, and informal mechanisms of increasing social cohesion and tolerance. In this
realm, women are key actors—as wives and mothers, they are often the backbone of
society, while as victims, their experiences must also be voiced to facilitate forgiveness.
As Porter (2001) noted, women often exhibit the ability to “dialogue across
differences”—which catalyzes reconciliation efforts and promotes the inclusion of all
sides in these discussions.83 In the aftermath of conflict, women are more likely to form
inter-ethnic associations to deal with remaining difficulties; in doing so, they create a
“shared space” for diverse women and also contribute to the healing process.84 As so
many women have experience traumatic sexual violence, they are particularly sensitive to
such experiences—thus organizations and individual women often provide psycho-social
counseling to victims in the aftermath. By listening to testimonies, women help to relieve
victims of emotional burdens that would potential lead to sustained animosity.
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Women’s organizations also frequently promote an awareness of human rights and
address issues of justice by assisting victims with their compensation claims; these
activities are vital to creating a sense of trust by providing closure for victims rather than
lingering uncertainty.85 As witnesses, women are crucial to a variety of cases because
they were not directly involved in the fighting; thus, women—more so than male
soldiers—are better able to provide information about crimes perpetrated against civilians
or their own relevant experiences.86 In this way, women can help to bring more
perpetrators to justice, publicly demonstrating the costs of committing war crimes and so
deterring similar actions in the future. Further, because women are “less afraid of
breaking down, crying in public or showing strong emotion,” they contribute to a more
conducive atmosphere for genuine sharing and forgiveness.87 Women are more likely
than men to engage in symbolic acts of forgiveness or to display empathy also towards
those who perpetrated violence against them, which can inspire others to follow such an
example toward meaningful reconciliation. Because widespread sexual violence is
common, women’s participation in prosecuting those who violated them is also vital to
their own psychological healing and to deterring such acts in the future. Thus, through
both their participation and facilitation, women and women’s organizations contribute to
mending the social fabric post-conflict and fostering trust between different groups. In
turn, this healing prevents previous hatreds from being co-opted to motivate a return to
violence and also provides a necessary mechanism for dealing with the atrocities of war
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while working towards a more positive future—making peace increasingly more
appealing than a repetition of the past.

iv. Fostering Civil Society
Long-term peace is achieved by incorporating a variety of actors and working from
both the top-down and the bottom-up. As discussed in relation to peacebuilding, the
realm of civil society is separate from the personal, economic and political spheres;
however, it can influence and bolster the efforts of each of the three peacebuilding
objectives above: reducing fear and mistrust, rebuilding political and economic
institutions and promoting reconciliation. In civil society, women are often community
leaders and central player in NGOs, and so are poised to significantly contribute to
grassroots initiatives for sustaining peace. The discussions of women’s roles above have
all included contributions from the realm of civil society, such as women’s organizations
providing counseling services to victims of violence or networks of women working
together to renew there economic livelihoods. Further, because of shared experiences
during war and a common desire to eliminate violence, women are likely to form
coalitions that address a variety of needs during the period of peacebuilding—particularly
when the state is unable or unwilling to provide necessary social services. For example,
women’s grassroots organizations address issues such as children and adult education,
build up primary healthcare services, help to reintegrate refugees and former combatants,
offer micro-loans and provide counseling for psychological distress.88 In doing so,
women directly contribute to improving their communities and to overall development
88
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efforts; these initiatives promote peace by providing incentives for non-violence and by
promoting cooperation across ethnic, religious and cultural lines.
While women may be formally incorporated into politics, as discussed above,
women’s organizations also work through civil society to positively influence the
political agenda and pressure leaders to maintain peace. Informally, women’s
organizations can undertake strategies such as “corridor lobbying,” by literally waiting in
hallways to talk to negotiators as they enter or exit rooms during breaks; women’s groups
provide these actors with proposals and receive updates on progress of negotiations.89
Women are then able to take this information back to their communities, contributing to a
more collaborative process than would otherwise occur based on the exclusivity of those
involved in the post-conflict decision-making process. This is particularly true as, in
comparison to international or governmental organizations, women’s groups can more
effectively disseminate information that resonates with the populace and are better able to
reach marginalized or illiterate groups due to their existing community-based structures.90
Women’s groups also often lobby politicians during the process of constitutionmaking, ensuring that their rights are recognized and attempting to increase the scope of
those rights.91 In the case of Rwanda, for example, women’s groups were successful in
changing property laws so that women could inherit land from male relatives—this
expansion of rights contributed to stability of society as well as the economic viability of
many women and their families in the post-conflict period. Because women’s
organizations are generally local, they are able to anticipate and evaluate the effects of
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top-down policies on their communities, allowing them to better identify barriers to peace
or opportunities for positive development. Women’s associations can also significantly
shape public opinion through grassroots movements and public demonstrations, such as
mass mobilizations for peace whenever there is a threat of a return to violence.92 Thus,
even when not in office, women’s commitment to peace manifest itself within civil
society and raises the costs of going a return to war for politicians—particularly as
women often form the majority of electorate in the post-war period due to high mortality
levels among male soldiers. Further, in terms of candidates, women have been found to
be more likely to support candidates who demonstrate a commitment to “peace,
moderation and reform.” In this way, individual women also hold politicians accountable
for maintaining peace and contribute to the creation of a more moderate political body.93
In general, women are the most prominent actors in civil society and contribute to its
vibrancy and growth post-conflict through the proliferation of women’s organizations
committed to serving the needs of the population and promoting peace. By providing
social and economic services, contributing to reconciliation efforts and pressuring
political leaders to maintain peace and create a more responsive government, women in
civil society combat the underlying causes of conflict and raise the costs of returning to
war—reinforcing reconstruction efforts and the likelihood that peace will prevail.
In conclusion, individual women and women’s organizations employ a variety of
strategies to work towards peace and stability following conflict; however, as the above
discussion has demonstrated, all of these pathways can increase the probability of
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sustainable peace through numerous, overlapping mechanisms. By initiating a dialogue
between both sides and creating opportunities for collaboration—built on the exchange of
information and growth of trust—women disrupt spirals of fear by reducing uncertainty
about the other side’s actions and intentions. In promoting inclusive political and
economic institutions, women help to address the root causes of conflict and so remove
previous motivations for violence. Women’s organizations can further generate political
pressure to raise the costs for leaders of returning to war. Women’s dedication to
reconciliation also helps to build trust and demonstrate the future costs of war—such as
retributive justice for war crimes or social pressure to maintain peace. Working within
civil society, women and women’s organizations contribute to all of these initiatives
while providing tangible benefits to their communities and incentives to move beyond a
violent past towards a more peaceful future.

IV. Case Selection and Research Design
1. Methodology
As the potential causal mechanisms linking women’s participation to peace have
been explored above, it is now necessary to address this phenomenon in practice—both to
corroborate the theoretical arguments put forth and to illuminate particular areas or
mechanisms by which women are effective in building peace. To accomplish this, four
case studies of conflict within sub-Saharan Africa will be examined—the Rwandan Civil
War (1990-1993), the Rwandan Genocide (1994), the First Liberian Civil War (19891996), and the Second Liberian Civil War (1999-2003). The logic underlying these case
selections will be discussed below; first, however, the independent and dependent
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variables—women’s participation and peace outcomes, respectively—must be qualified
along different dimensions of analysis:

i. Women’s Participation
As the independent variable, women’s participation for each conflict must be
quantified to a certain degree. This is complicated, because—as shown above—women’s
participation is often multi-faceted and can occur in one or many realms of
peacebuilding. Thus, women’s participation will be classified as either “high,”
“moderate,” or “low” based the degree of participation measured for each of four
peacebuilding functions described above. However, each of these includes an almost
infinite myriad of potential activities and initiatives to achieve peace. Thus, women’s
contributions to one dimension of each category of peacebuilding will be analyzed. The
justification for this is two-fold: for one, certain aspects of peacebuilding are often
beyond the scope of local women—such as enacting economic sanctions or providing an
armed force to oversee a ceasefire. Thus, the analysis of women’s participation in all
arenas is not equally productive. Secondly, by focusing on specific dimensions of
peacebuilding, more accurate comparisons of participation can be made both across
conflicts and across time. These dimensions will be identified and explained below, and
will then be quantified on the high, medium and low scale for each of the four conflicts:

a. Reducing Fear and Mistrust: Women and Reintegration
In her analysis of peacekeeping, Fortna (2008) identifies a number of causal
mechanisms through which peacekeeping forces can reduce fear and mistrust among

Mary McCarthy | 44

belligerents, preventing a relapse in violence due to the security dilemma. These
mechanisms include a neutral monitoring force to observe a ceasefire—making a surprise
attack more difficult, outside aid conditional on compliance with a peace agreement or
the provision of reliable information to both sides.94 It must be acknowledged that none
of these undertakings necessarily require the involvement of women; however, the
process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is critical to ensuring
peaceful relations—and, in this area, women can substantially contribute in two particular
ways.
Following conflict, both sides have incentives to maintain their arms in the
absence of credible information that the other side is also disarming. Warring factions
may have limited communication with each other, making both parties wary of claims
that are not substantiated by a third party. In this way, women can assist in the DDR
process by communicating with both sides and directly aiding in the disarmament of
belligerents. While individual women may contribute in this way, it is often an initiative
undertaken by women’s organizations and grassroots associations. Thus, this communitybased reintegration facilitated by women will be considered under the realm of civil
society.
However, women can also participate directly in the DDR process: although male
combatants are by far more common—women are also perpetrators of violence during
conflict—and so their participation in the DDR process is integral to full compliance by
both sides. The tenacity of women who voluntarily join such movements should not be
discounted; such women should be equally regarded as potential spoilers, alongside
young male combatants. Further, women are often integral to the maintenance of armed
94
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movements—performing duties such as cooking, spying or producing food.95 Therefore,
the successful incorporation of women into the DDR process, as a means of reducing fear
and mistrust, will be classified as high, moderate or low for each conflict, based the
participation of female combatants and the extent to which these programs are responsive
to the particular needs of women fights. However, it should be noted that the calculation
for including women in the DDR process and the relevancy of this participation vary
based on the number of female combatants during the war. Specifically, because of the
low number of female fighters, this dimension is not as relevant in the case of Rwanda’s
Civil War.

b.

Rebuilding Political and Economic Institutions: Women in Formal Politics
Following prolonged conflict, it is necessary to create inclusive political and

economic institutions to remedy the root causes of civil war and also to provide a
foundation for non-violent means of dealing with disagreements. Rebuilding, or often
building, these institutions is a long-term, complex process. It is further complicated by
the need to appease all belligerents, who may resort to violence if they feel they are
losing ground politically. As discussed above, women can contribute to both political and
economic stability in the aftermath of conflict. However, this study will focus on the
formal political inclusion of women, indicated by initiatives such as (1) the creation of
governmental departments dedicated to gender, (2) constitutional amendments to
empower women, or (3) the implementation of quotas to ensure women’s representation
in government.
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c.

Reconciliation: Accountability for Crimes Against Women
While reconciliation is necessary for all members of a post-conflict society—men and

women, civilians and combatants—the prevalence of sexual violence against women and
girls during conflict demands special attention. Because of the physical, psychological
and social effects of this violence, the rehabilitation and reconciliation of women requires
a high degree of accountability for such crimes. If these crimes are not acknowledged,
and the perpetrators are not held socially or legally responsible, then women are denied
necessary closure and remain vulnerable to future assaults. This hampers efforts for
forgiveness and the ability of society as a whole to progress towards a more positive, less
violent future. Therefore, although women can contribute to reconciliation through
grassroots efforts and everyday interactions, instead women’s participation will be
determined by the degree accountability for sexual violence for each conflict.

d.

Civil Society: Involvement of Women’s Organizations and Associations
Finally, the importance of civil society for supporting peace efforts on the

grassroots level has been demonstrated, along with the central role that women’s
organizations play in this sphere. These women’s organizations can serve as an impetus
for peace talks by placing pressure on key actors to attend or to maintain peace. During
and after a civil war, they may serve a variety of purposes such as the provision of basic
needs, psychological counseling or helping to reintegrate refugees and support widows or
orphans. Thus, the final variable will be the degree of engagement by women’s
organizations and associations (1) directly in the peace negotiations and (2) their
involvement afterwards in promoting sustainable peace through diverse programs and
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initiatives. To access this engagement, both the existence of women’s organizations and
their objectives and services will be analyzed, linking those objectives to the broader
goals of fostering peace and progressing toward a more vibrant, participatory society. The
resulting classification by conflict for each category can be seen in Table 1 below:

Table 1: Classification of Women's Participation

Participation
in DDR
Process

Formal Political
Inclusion

Accountability
for Gender
Crimes

Involvement of
Women’s
Organizations

LOW*

LOW

LOW

LOW

MODERATE

HIGH

MODERATE

HIGH

Liberia, 1989-1996

LOW

MODERATE

LOW

HIGH

Liberia, 1999-2003

HIGH

MODERATE

MODERATE

HIGH

Rwanda, 1990-1993
Rwanda, 1994

* While the accurate classification for women’s participation in the DDR process for this conflict
is “low,” only a small number of women participated as members of fighting forces. Therefore, it
is not as relevant as in the other three conflicts.

ii. Peace Outcomes
Having defined the dimensions along which women’s participation will be
measured, the dependent variable—peace outcomes—must also be qualified. In this case,
a “peace success” will be considered a sustained peace lasting between five and ten years
past the cessation of violence. Because peacebuilding is a long-term process with
enduring peace as the ultimate goal, this timeframe allows for a robust measure of the
success of such peacebuilding initiatives. This is a particularly valid metric as almost half
of conflicts resume within five years of a ceasefire. Conversely then, a “peace failure”
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will be classified as a conflict that, having reached a ceasefire, relapses into civil war
within five years of the cessation of violence. Of the four cases being considered, the
Rwandan Genocide and Second Liberian Civil War represent “peace successes,” while
the Rwandan Civil War and First Liberian Civil War represent “peace failures.”

iii. Overall Comparison: Women’s Participation to Peace Outcomes
Table 2 below demonstrates the classifications for each case study: comparing
overall women’s participation against the ultimate peace outcome. While the preceding
table allows for a more nuanced analysis of women’s participation—specifically the
possibility of identifying which realms may be more influential— the following table
looks at the combined effects of women’s participation in these dimensions on peace
outcomes. Women’s participation occurs along a spectrum; therefore, the ratings for each
of the dimensions discussed above must be considered holistically to determine whether a
conflict experienced substantial women’s participation or insubstantial participation.
Because there are currently no cases in which women’s participation in all of the four
peacebuilding dimensions analyzed can be considered high, these ratings are necessarily
relative—categorizations of “high” or “substantial” participation thus do not represent the
ideal level of women’s participation in peacebuilding, but rather a realistic assessment of
the extent to which women and their concerns were addressed post-conflict.
To categorize each conflict’s peacebuilding process as involving either substantial
or insubstantial participation on the part of women, the dimensions displayed in Table 1
were considered in total. As is clear from the table, the Rwandan Civil War was a case of
insubstantial women’s participation, receiving “low” ratings for each dimension. The
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remaining three cases are considered examples of substantial women’s participation.
However, they represent a range of that participation—with Liberia’s first civil war
qualifying as substantial because it demonstrates a clear shift toward including women
and because of the unprecedented vibrancy of women’s organizations and associations in
civil society. In contrast, the second Liberian civil war and post-genocide Rwanda did not
have low women’s participation for any dimension and so are more robust examples of
substantial participation. These variations will be discussed in more detail in the
following case studies.

Table 2: Women's Participation and Peace Outcomes

Peace Success
Substantial Women’s
Participation
Insubstantial Women’s
Participation

Liberia, 1999-2003
Rwanda, 1994

Peace Failure
Liberia, 1989-1996*
Rwanda, 1990-1993

* Relative to prior peacebuilding efforts, this case clearly involves substantial participation on
the part of women. When considered against the other cases, however, this would represent more
“moderate” participation than in either Liberia (1999-2003) or Rwanda (1994).

Because this paper acknowledges that peace can be, and often is, achieved
without integrating women into the peace process, a case study of peace success
following insubstantial women’s participation will not be undertaken. Such successes—
for example, in the case of Mozambique—do not undermine the potential for women to
facilitate peacebuilding, but it must be noted that the achievement of peace is a
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complicated process that involves a multitude of variables, of which gender is just a
single component.

2. Case Selection
In terms of case selection, there are a number of justifications for analyzing two
civil wars within two countries—Liberia and Rwanda. By holding the country constant
for each of the two sets of conflicts, a diachronic comparison is possible—eliminating
many of the confounding variables that occur when attempting a cross-country
comparison. This is especially relevant in terms of the peace successes following the
Rwandan Genocide and the Second Liberian Civil War, as the “root causes” of the
conflicts carried over from the countries’ first civil wars—eliminating many mitigating
factors—and making successful peacebuilding following the increased participation of
women more significant.
As cross-country comparisons, both Liberia and Rwanda are sub-Saharan African
states that experienced conflicts within relatively the same timeframe. Although the
specifics of the conflicts vary, both states have a history of exclusionary rule by a
minority and also of ethnic tensions exacerbated by poor economic conditions and
repressive regimes. In all four of the conflicts, women were involved both as combatants
and as victims. While attempting to achieve peace following the initial conflicts, both
countries experienced spoiler problems and relapsed into violence. Thus, the conditions
of the two countries exhibit significant similarities, validating such a comparison.
Further, both Liberia and Rwanda embody the all-too-common occurrence of recurring
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civil wars on the African continent: as such, the findings of this research may be
applicable to future civil wars in this region.
However, no perfect comparison is possible with real world cases, and thus the
differences between the two conflicts must be acknowledged. Historically, Rwanda has
had a prolonged period of colonial occupation—first by Germany and then by Belgium—
which entrenched ethnic divides. Europeans, on the other hand, never colonized Liberia;
instead, freed African-American slaves settled the country in the early 1800’s and created
an exclusive oligarchy. Though their histories are divergent, both cases include a
minority population ruling over the majority for a significant period of time, to the
detriment of most citizens. Another difference involves conflict duration, as both
Liberian civil wars were more protected than those experienced in Rwanda (lasting from
1989 until 1996 and 1999 until 2003). In contrast, the Rwandan Civil War lasted only
three years (1990—1993) and the Rwandan genocide in 1994 was particularly intense,
lasting less than a year. While Rwanda relapsed into violence only a year after the
ceasefire in 1993, peacebuilding efforts actually began in 1992 before the formal signing
of the Arusha Accords. In Liberia, a relative peace prevailed for three years following the
signing of the Abuja Accord in 1996. Finally, the Rwandan genocide was ended through
a military victory, while Liberia’s second civil war concluded due to a negotiated
settlement. This distinction impacted women’s opportunity for involvement in peace
negotiations; however, women were still major participants in the peacebuilding process
as a whole. Although differences clearly exist between the Rwandan Genocide and
Liberia’s second civil war, that women in both countries played an essential role in
achieving peace and still contribute to sustaining that peace—despite the differences in
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conflict type and duration—demonstrates that an element of high women’s participation
can be integral to achieving peace even across varying conflicts.
As a counterpoint to the successes enjoyed with high women’s participation, the
failed peace process in Rwanda in 1993 will be examined. In this case, women were not
included in any decision-making processes and were marginalized both in society and
politics. Because the causes of the conflict remained steady throughout, this provides a
salient comparison to the gender mainstreaming undertaken following the genocide.
While the brutal legacy and international attention resulting from the genocide altered
some of the peace dynamics, the addition of women to the peace process can be seen as
another key component in achieving lasting peace.
Finally, Liberia’s first civil war represents a case study in which substantial
women’s participation still resulted in a peace failure. The analysis of this conflict
contributes to the boundaries of this paper’s argument: despite numerous, active women’s
organizations and a moderate degree of political inclusion, high women’s participation
cannot necessarily overcome other forces detrimental to peace. While this peace failure
appears to undermine the central argument, two variables in particular must be
considered. First, while women’s groups participated in the negotiations and
peacebuilding process during the first conflict, they were better able to organize
collectively and utilize international resources during the second conflict—which
involved Sierra Leone and Guinea, thus adding a regional dimension. And secondly, the
effect of Charles Taylor as a powerful spoiler cannot be ignored. Thus, the argument that
women’s participation contributes to lasting peace must be qualified and this case study
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in particularly will highlight both the effects of varying degrees of participation and the
limitations of such participation.
Having briefly introduced the four case studies, the sections that follow will
provide the background for each conflict and an analysis of each of the four dimensions
of women’s participation as they correspond to the four functions of peacebuilding:
Table 3: Metrics of Women's Participation

Peacebuilding Function
1. Reducing Fear and Mistrust

2. Rebuilding Institutions

Women’s Dimension
Women’s Involvement in the DDR Process

Women’s Formal Political Inclusion

3. Reconciliation

Accountability for Crimes Against Women

4. Fostering Civil Society

Participation of Women’s Organizations in
the Peace Process and Afterwards

The justification for each dimension’s rating will be elaborated on as well as the success
or failure of the peace outcome. Taken together, these four case studies provide the
qualitative data in support of the paper’s core argument.
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V. Case Studies
1. Rwandan Civil War: 1990—1993
i. Conflict Background
Like many African nations, the roots of the Rwandan Civil War can be traced back, at
least in part, to its colonial legacy. Until Germany conquered and colonized the state in
1890’s, Rwanda was a centralized kingdom. Throughout its history, Rwanda has had two
principle ethnic groups—sharing a common history, language and culture. These are the
Tutsi minority, which comprise 10 percent of the population, and the Hutu majority that
makes up almost 90 percent.96 Despite many similarities, the Tutsis tend to be tall and
slim with straight noses, while the Hutus are regarded as shorter with broad noses. First
under German and later Belgium rule, the Tutsis were privileged in the political and
economic realms, subjecting the Hutus to an indirect rule. Beyond the institutionalization
of Tutsi superiority, the Belgians contributed to ethnic tensions by printing identification
cards that classified citizens as either Hutu or Tutsi—solidifying ethnic and class
differences that had previously been more fluid.97
In 1959, the Hutu resentment regarding the Tutsi’s rule led to a revolution and the
overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy. During this time, thousands of Tutsis were driven into
exile in Uganda. The Belgians, desiring to change Rwanda into a majority-rule
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democracy, supported the Hutus’ replacement of the Tutsis in local government. Soon
afterwards, in 1962, Rwanda gained independence from Belgium and installed a
republican regime; the violence involved in these political struggles displaced more Tutsi
citizens into Uganda. Eventually, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, ascended
to power through a coup d’etat in 1973, consolidating his authoritarian control by
systematically excluding Tutsis from political and economic institutions. Habyarimana
established a one-party system, comprised of his own political party, known as the
National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND).
Around this time, the more than one hundred thousand Rwandan refugees in
surrounding states began to demand democratic reforms and accommodations for their
return home. Rwandan was simultaneously experiencing an economic crisis due a decline
in coffee prices, making the Habyarimana’s government even less eager to deal with an
influx of Tutsi citizens. Frustrated by Habyarimana’s inaction towards implementing
democratic reforms or allowing them to repatriate, Tutsi refugees in Ugandan formed the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). On October 1, 1990, RPF guerilla forces launched an
attack on Rwanda—initiating the Rwandan civil war. Although the RPF made significant
progress in the beginning, Habyarimana’s Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) received
support from France, Belgium and Zaire to combat the resistance.
Having been pushed back to the northeast, RPF forces regrouped and rebuilt
leadership. Notably, Paul Kagame returned from the United States at this time to head the
RPF forces and to begin a guerilla-style war in northern Rwanda. Over the next couple
years, low-intensity fighting continued as the RPF carried out hit-and-run style guerilla
warfare. Finally, on July 13, 1992, a ceasefire was signed in Arusha, Tanzania—this
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included a fixed timetable for ending the fighting and initiating political talks. However,
reports of Tutsi massacres prompted the RPF to launch a major offensive in February
1993, threatening the capital, Kigali. In response, French troops were sent in,
undermining the rebels’ progress. Ultimately, under international pressure, the Arusha
Accords were signed in August 1993. This peace agreement called for an unconditional
ceasefire, the repatriation of refugees and a transition to a power-sharing democracy, to
be overseen by neutral peacekeeping forces. Due international indifference, the
requirement of 5,500 international troops was never met; later that year, Habyarimana
was sworn in as interim head of state for the transitional national government. Although
the violence was arrested, political and ethnic tensions in Rwanda remained high.

ii. Women’s Participation: Insubstantial
1. Women and the DDR Process: LOW
During Rwanda’s civil war, both governmental and RPF forces perpetrated violence
against civilians, caught in a vicious cycle of retribution. The Rwandan military would
attack Tutsis in government-held areas, causing the RPF to retaliate by massacring Hutus
while advancing on Kigali. Between 1990 and 1993, it is estimated that government
forces killed almost 2,000 civilians; in addition, the RPF is responsible for approximately
150 civilian deaths.98 Therefore, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of
both sides was a necessary condition for peace—raising the costs of relapsing into
violence. The Arusha Accords also called for integrating the armed forces to create a
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nationally unified army, balancing the Hutu-based military with a Tutsi presence.99 This
process of integration and re-integration was to involve “assembling the ex-combatants in
reorganization camps, and orienting them to national politics, and emphasizing national
unity.”100
Even prior to the genocide, both Hutu and Tutsi women participated in violent
activities. In particular, Hutu women served in the Rwandan army—with the number of
female soldiers increasing towards the end of the civil war, leading up to the 1994
genocide.101 The RPF also recruited women to serve as soldiers, often through plays,
songs and dances.102 Further, some women played vital supporting roles for both factions
by preparing meals and providing shelter or resources—voluntarily or involuntarily. For
example, one Amnesty International report on the conflict noted that women were
integral in helping rebels to transport weapons.103 While the exact number of female
participants, direct or supporting, in the conflict is not known, it is clear that neither the
Arusha Accords nor any discussion of the DDR process makes particular mention of
women and their specific needs post-conflict. Instead, the majority of the negotiations in
this realm focused on the ethnic breakdown of the unified military. Ultimately, the RPF
was to compromise 40 percent of the Rwandan army, with 60 percent of the current Hutu
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soldiers remaining. Habyarimana’s MRND was given control over the military, while
RPF was to control the gendarmerie.104
Overall, women did participate both as soldiers and supporters during the Rwandan
civil war—though on a small scale. Even so, the Arusha Accords neither acknowledged
this role nor provided mechanisms by which women could be incorporated into the DDR
process. However, it should be noted that the low number of female combatants makes
this exclusion less relevant than in the following conflicts.

2. Women’s Political Participation: LOW
Unlike the broad references made to integration and DDR processes, the peace
negotiations and Arusha Accords included specific outlines for the new Rwandan
constitution as well as the formation of both a transitional and a permanent power-sharing
government. At the time of the 1993 ceasefire, women were not entirely absent from
Rwandan politics; however, they were severely under-represented. Despite comprising
half the population, women accounted for only 17% of the members of parliament (12
seats out of a total of 70). This bias penetrated to the local levels, as there were no female
prefects (mayors), and only 1% of leaders at the sector level were women.105 Regardless
of this glaring imbalance, and the harmful effects of the civil war on women, no specific
constitutional conditions or political arrangements were discussed to ensure greater
participation of women in the formal political sphere.
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The Arusha Accords include seven agreements between the Rwandan Government
and the Rwandanese Patriotic Front—two of these focus on legal and political
institutions: the Agreement on the Rule of Law and the Agreement on Power-Sharing
within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government. Within the first
agreement, references are made to the “equality of all citizens before the law” and the
“rejection of all exclusions and any form of discrimination based notably on ethnicity,
region, sex and religion” which were to be given precedence over the statutes of the
previous Rwandan Constitution.106 Although these broad statements can be seen as
endowing women with equal rights as men, they did not institutionalize any means of
achieving this equality within the political realm, a necessary measure due to the
substantial cultural and economic barriers faced by women in relation to men.
The second agreement stipulates the terms of power-sharing between the two warring
factions. Within the transitional government, the former ruling party was given five posts;
the RPF was also given five posts, including the position of Vice-Prime Minister. The
major opposition party, the Mouvement Democratique Republicain, was given four
posts—including the office of Prime Minister. Finally, RPF was granted participation in
the national assembly. This transitional government was to function, with Habyarimana
as President, until democratic elections could be undertaken within the next year.107
Again, the focus was on appeasing the belligerents and no mention is made to
incorporating women, or even non-combatants or elements of civil society in general,
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into the new government. Ultimately, neither the updates to the Rwandan Constitution
nor the plans for rebuilding political institutions led to an increase of women in the
political realm. Thus, formal political participation by women following the Rwandan
Civil War must be considered low.

1.

Accountability for Gender Crimes: LOW
Although brutal massacres and sexual violence were less prevalent during the civil

war than the subsequent genocide, women were frequently still the victims of sexual
violence. One Human Right Watch report found that “Rwandan soldiers frequently rape
women, but because they are never punished for the crime, victims rarely report the
attacks.”108 The report details the abuses that women often faced after accusing soldiers
of rape, occasionally resulting in death. The growing prevalence of AIDS also made rape
a particularly heinous crime, with an estimated 40 percent of the population of Kigali
HIV-positive at the time. Rwandan soldiers were not discriminating in their sexual
violence, raping girls as young as 12 and 13, although attacks on Tutsi women were more
frequent.109 The RPF was also involved in raping Hutu women, killing at least 147
civilians and raping hundreds more over the course of the conflict.110
Thus, Rwandan women suffered significantly due to sexual violence during the
course of the conflict—justifying a high level of accountability for such crimes.
However, the identification and prosecution of perpetrators never materialized. Despite
calls by Human Rights Watch, and other humanitarian organizations, to bring to trial all
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person who “have been accused of killings and other gross abuses of human rights,”
including sexual violence, prosecution for sexual crimes was not included the Arusha
Peace Agreements nor given as a condition for either to side to participate in the
transitional government.111 Although rape is technically prosecutable under Rwandan
criminal law, few inspectors—and few women themselves—are aware of this.112 Further,
the social stigma of rape prevents many women from coming forward without the
assurance that their claims will be taken seriously and support will be provided.
In the post-conflict period, the focus was on creating a transitional government and
appeasing the opposing parties—the effects on women, and ordinary Rwandans at large,
were largely marginalized. As such, accountability for crimes against women was
unequivocally low. However, it should be noted that this lack of accountability was not
unique: a wide spectrum of crimes perpetrated during the war—against both genders—
were not addressed and no formal program of reconciliation was implemented postconflict.

2. Participation of Women’s Organizations: LOW
Finally, the participation of women’s organizations in the peace progress and
afterwards must be examined to determine the extent of their influence in civil society. A
survey of Rwandan civil society organizations in 1986 found that of 1,457
organizations—143 of them were registered as women’s NGOs, around one-tenth of the
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total number of organizations.113 Prior to the war, these groups focused on bringing
attention to the needs of women and also on the importance of incorporating women in
the development process.114
While these grassroots organizations existed, they were largely marginalized during
the peace process. In terms of formal negotiations, none of these groups—nor any
prominent women—were represented; instead, the ceasefire and Arusha Accords were
achieved through a combination of international pressure, regional mediation and
compromise between the warring factions. As Mazurana (2005) noted, “the agreement
made little reference to the gendered impact of conflict or the role of women in
peacebuilding in general” due to the absence of Rwandan women in Arusha.115 This
marginalization reflected a broader trend within Rwandan society regarding the treatment
of women: traditionally, women were dependant on their male relatives for access to
resources and so their status derived from that of their fathers, brothers and husbands.116
Such dependence made it difficult for women’s organizations to function prior to the
influx of international funding following the genocide. Further, the lack of women’s
political representation meant that their needs were often overlooked, and women’s
organizations in the civil sphere were not given acknowledgement or support by the
existing political structure.
These few women’s organizations—only around 150 in a country of 7.5 million—
undoubtedly contributed to the provision of basic services and support to war widows or
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other women at the community level following the civil war; however, these
organizations lacked the visibility and leverage to afford them any measurable impact on
the peace process or post-conflict activities at both the local and national level. Because
of this, the participation of women’s organizations in this time period must also be
categorized as low.

iii. Peace Outcome: Failure
Having determined that women’s participation was low along all four dimensions of
the peacebuilding process, the peace outcome of the Rwandan Civil War must now be
analyzed. Although the Arusha Accords were initially regarded as one of the most
promising peace agreements in the history of African civil wars, these conditions failed to
prevent the unthinkable violence that unfolded during the subsequent Rwandan genocide
in 1994. Because the scope of this brutality shocked the world, it is particularly important
to compare this first civil war and its period of peacebuilding with the later efforts to
determine whether certain alterations could have prevented the ensuing tragedy. The
Arusha Accords also function as a baseline against which the following case studies can
be measured—together they represent a standard, well-received peace agreement that
nonetheless incorporated neither an acknowledgement of the specific burdens the civil
war placed on women nor any mechanisms by which women could be incorporated into
or contribute to the peacebuilding process. Further, an analysis of this case study serves
to emphasize the significant paradigm shift that occurred only a year later, following the
genocide, regarding women’s role in society and in peacebuilding.
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Thus, the first Rwandan civil war is an example of insubstantial women’s
participation followed by a peace failure. While a claim cannot be made that a lack of
women’s participation directly resulted in the resumption of violence—as the existence
of a massive number of displaced refugees, rising ethnic tensions and an economic crisis
all contributed to the instability of peace—the following case studies will illustrate
potential ways in which women’s participation may have facilitated a longer period of
non-violence, and so provided more extensive time in which to ease ethnic tensions.

2. Rwandan Genocide: 1994
i. Conflict Background
As per the Arusha Accords, Habyarimana was sworn in as interim president of the
Rwandan transitional national government on January 5, 1994. However, delays had
plagued implementation of the Arusha requirements, including the integration of armed
forces into a nationally unified military. In the meantime, government forces continued to
sporadically kill Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Despite a formal end to the violence, the
underlying causes of the civil war and escalating ethnic tensions led to a fragile peace. To
address this, a summit was held in early April in Tanzania—the presidents of Tanzania,
Burundi, Kenya and Uganda all pressured Habyarimana to implement the transition
program in keeping with the agreed upon timetable.117 While flying home to Rwanda,
Habyarimana’s plane was blown out of the sky on April 6, 1994 by undetermined
assailants.
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This incident catalyzed extremist Hutu militia groups, known as the interahamwe,
to initiate a series of organized attacks on the Tutsi population and moderate Hutus.
Within the hour, the interahamwe set up roadblocks across the country and began
checking identity cards—killing Tutsis and human rights activists using machetes and
iron bars.118 The Hutu militia groups also used Radio Television Libre des Milles Collins
(RTLM) and Radio Rwanda to spread messages of ethnic hatred and genocide,
motivating ordinary Hutus to eliminate Tutsis across the country. Within one hundred
days, around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed, including women, children
and the elderly. This slaughter was carried out with knives, clubs, machetes and iron bars.
Grenades were thrown into churches and other areas where large groups of Tutsis had
taken sheltered, hundreds of people were burned alive in pits lined with flaming tires, and
the Hutu militia entered hospitals to systematically murder the sick and wounded.119
In response to these genocidal killings, RPF forces remobilized and began to advance
towards Kigali—causing the Hutu government to flee west. To shield their retreat, the
militia forced approximately of Hutu to flee with them into neighboring Tanzania and
Zaire, destroying the state’s infrastructure along the way.120 Thus, a civil war was waged
concurrently with the genocide, as RPF forces engaged the militia in conventional
warfare. Despite the minimal presence of Belgium peacekeepers, acting under the
auspices of the United Nations, the situation was considered “too risky” to deploy more
troops—and the Belgian peacekeepers not given permission to intervene.121 The
international community refused to acknowledge the mass killings as genocide; the
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United States, following the peacekeeping debacle in Somalia, was especially reluctant to
become involved.122 In July, the RPF achieved a military victory and control of Kigali.
They then established a coalition government, called the “Government of National
Unity,” and outlawed the Hutu-led MRND party.
The genocide lasted from the beginning of April 1994 until mid-July of that year;
however, the disastrous effects continue to impact Rwandan society and have motivated
claims on the part of the international community to “never again” allow such an atrocity
to unfold. While exact numbers are not know, around 300,000 Tutsis are thought to have
survived the genocide, representing only 30 percent of their original numbers.123 And, as
mentioned above, rape was the rule rather than exception for women during the
genocide—with between 250,000 and 500,000 Rwandese women and girls falling victim
to sexual violence. The widespread use of rape also contributed to the spread of
HIV/AIDS in Rwanda, with thousands of victims now HIV-positive. The conflict left
nearly 400,000 children orphaned, with many of them forced to become heads of
families.124 War widows experienced a similar fate, as many Rwandan men were either
killed or imprisoned as a result of the genocide, leaving women as the sole providers for
their families. In addition, half of the country’s population of eight million was uprooted
as a result of the conflict—with two million Rwandans fleeing to neighboring nations and
another two million internally displaced.125 This displacement as well as extremely high
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mortality rates during the conflict led to a significant demographic shift, with women
making 70 percent of the Rwandan population in the direct aftermath.126
These extreme conditions, coupled with extensive psychological trauma among the
population, framed the post-genocide peacebuilding initiative in Rwanda. In particular,
the new prominence of women and female-headed households necessitated a shift in
underlying gender norms—a shift that is reflected in the substantial incorporation of
women into the peacebuilding process in comparison to the previous Rwandan civil war,
and—in fact—in comparison to the majority of peace initiatives previously undertaken
on the African continent. The specifics of this participation will be discussed below.

ii. Women’s Participation: Substantial
1. Women and the DDR Process: MODERATE
While women were undeniably victimized throughout the genocide, they were also
the perpetrators of violence and were occasionally “instrumental in organizing,
promoting and authorizing genocidal killings.”127 As of March 2010, almost two
thousand women remain in Rwandan prisons, having been convicted of genocide-related
offences.128 Although women account for only 6% of the genocide-related detainees,
Nicole Hogg’s (2010) research has demonstrated that these numbers probably
underestimate the level of women’s involvement in the conflict. While ordinary women
infrequently participated in direct killings, they contributed to the genocide principally by
looting Tutsi property, revealing the hiding spots of Tutsis to the killers and supporting
126
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their men-folk in perpetrating violence.129 Though indirect, women were still
instrumental in informing killers of Tutsi hiding spots—and many simply did not
consider the systematic elimination of their Tutsi neighbors as any of their business.
In addition, numerous women in leadership positions both supported and helped to
organize the genocide. Currently, forty-seven women are on the list of 2,202 “Category
1” genocide suspects130—in other words, individuals suspected of planning or organizing
the genocide, as well as those in leadership roles who committed or encouraged genocide,
crimes against humanity or war crimes.131 In particular, extensive evidence exists that
Agathe Kanziga—the widow of former Rwandan President Habyarimana—was
instrumental in planning and executing the genocide, especially in the creation of the
extremist radio station RTLM and establishing the training of the interahamwe militia.132
Another infamous woman, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko—former Minister of Family Affairs
and Women’s Development—is considered one of the principle genocide suspects. She
has currently been charged with numerous crimes, including conspiracy to commit
genocide. Most notably, she is the first woman to be accused of rape before an
international tribunal, as she instructed such acts to be carried out by her subordinates.133
These women in leadership positions, while demonstrating that women are capable of
violence on par with men, are held accountable within the formal legal system rather than
participating in the DDR process. Instead, because women took part in the genocide as
members of the military or the rebel force, their participation justified the implementation
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of a disarmament demobilization and reintegration program that acknowledges the role
played by female combatants and also provides for their particular needs post-conflict,
both materially and socially. Due in part to the prominence of women in government and
the state’s proclaimed commitment to gender mainstreaming in all areas, Rwanda has
partially achieved this goal.
Since 1995, the country’s DDR program has successfully demobilized and
reintegrated almost 54,000 combatants.134 This program has occurred in two phases:
Phase I lasting from 1997 to 2001 and Phase II lasting from 2002 to 2007. Both of these
phases involved the demobilization and reintegration of former RPF combatants and of
soldiers in the Hutu-led Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR);135 in addition, rebels from
other insurgent groups and Rwandans involved in the conflict in the Congo have
participated, but this paper will focus on those combatants who were involved with the
1994 genocide. Although women account for less than 1% of all combatants in this
conflict, making their marginalization a significant possibility, the Rwandan
Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) has promoted, at least
rhetorically, the necessity of “paying particular attention to women” during this
process.136
In reality, however, the 2004 RDRC report stated that “no special support” was
provided for female soldiers who were demobilized during the first stage.137 Over the
course of Phase I, 18,692 soldiers demobilized—111 of which were women. However,
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these women were seen as key beneficiaries of the “Vulnerability Support Window,”
which consists of a monetary grant intended to assist the most challenged ex-combatants.
Of the 111 women demobilized during Phase I, two-thirds (or 73 women) accessed this
fund.138 Due to an influx of international money in support of DDR processes, Phase II
enjoyed better funding, and so all demobilized combatants—including women—received
reinsertion support packages. These packages consisted of a small monetary sum and
basic household supplies.139 In total, 260 female ex-combatants have benefited from this
reinsertion support.140 Ultimately, a total of 346 women have been demobilized and
reintegrated over the course of both phases.
While the post-genocide DDR process has purposefully female ex-combatants, it is
unlikely that the 346 demobilized women accurately reflect the real numbers of women
associated with the armed groups.141 Further, despite the additional monetary benefits
given to female combatants, these women remain among the poorest in their
communities.142 This impoverishment is most likely due to lost income over the course of
fighting and the social stigma surrounding active female participation in violence.
Although the RDRC claims to facilitate reintegration for these women’s, often the
program displays “no concern with gender issues within the communities the excombatants resettled.”143 Considering all of these factors, women’s participation in the
DDR process following the genocide can be classified as moderate. While some female
combatants have participated, the RDRC has not actively recruited women or
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incorporated the full number of women associated with the two factions. In terms of
incorporating women’s needs, the demobilization process has included additional
material support for women; however, integration is often hampered due to social stigma,
an issue that has not been adequately addressed by the RDRC. The existence of the
Ndabaga Association, a well-known NGO for former female combatants, demonstrates
that the formal DDR program has not sufficiently incorporated women nor addressed
their needs—although it has made notable progress in both these areas.144

2. Women’s Political Participation: HIGH
Despite being traditionally marginalized, in both the domestic and public spheres,
Rwandan women made significant gains in the formal political realm following the
genocide. The genocide dramatically altered the environment in Rwanda; as described
above, women were both disproportionately affected by the conflict and responsible for
rebuilding in the aftermath with so many men missing or killed. After taking power in
1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front created a transition government, called the
Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Paul Kagame. The GNU openly stated that
it considered women’s participation in peacebuilding and governance to be crucial for
sustainable peace.145 To ensure equal participation, the government undertook three main
initiatives: (1) creating a Ministry of Gender, (2) organizing women’s councils at all
levels of governance, and (3) implementing gender quotas for the national parliament.
These steps have resulted in a high level of women’s political participation and
representation within the formal government.
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Following the 1994 genocide, the GNU transitional government was to remain in
power for five years to ensure stability and a peaceful transition to democracy.146
However, the RPF extended this period by another five years in 1998, citing security
issues due to multi-party politics as one of the fundamental causes of the previous
conflict.147 Because of this, the political sphere was circumscribed until the first round of
district-level elections were held in 2001. However, the GNU still took positive steps
towards mainstreaming women politically and including them in positions of power.
Starting in 1994, they appointed women to high-profile positions such as “ministries,
secretaries of state, Supreme Court justices and parliamentarians.”148 In addition, they
quickly established the Ministry of Gender, Family and Social Affairs (MIGEFASO) and
implemented gender posts at all levels of government.149 These gender posts were meant
to ensure that all proposed policies are sensitive to the particular needs of women, a core
component of successful gender mainstreaming. In 1999, this ministry was reorganized,
becoming the Ministry of Gender and Women in Development (MIGEPROF), charged
with “integrating gender analytical frameworks in all legislation, reinforcing knowledge
of gender within all state structures, […] and promoting gender equality.”150 Thus, the
ministry was dedicated not only to the advancement of women, but also to mainstreaming
gender into all policies and to the acknowledgment that equal inclusion of both men and
women was necessary for successful development and sustainable peace.
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In addition to MIGEPROF, the Rwandan government also created women’s councils
to ensure that women participated in all levels of government—from the community level
up to the national. These councils function as a parallel system for women at each level
of government, with representatives elected in women-only elections, that then consult
with the general council at that corresponding level of government. In addition, the head
of each women’s council has a seat in the general council, to act as an official liaison.151
The official purpose of these councils, aside from advising on and promoting women’s
interests, is to “teach women how to participate in politics.”152 Because Rwandan women
have historically been marginalized in the political sphere, and often have more restricted
access to education, the opportunity for them to gain this experience—particularly for
those women at the local level—is invaluable for empowering them personally and for
overcoming entrenched cultural discrimination.
Finally, the GNU implemented significant constitutional and electoral reforms to
guarantee that women representatives also served at the higher levels of government.
Even before the creation the 2003 elections, the RPF had continued to appoint women to
seats in Parliament—with women holding 25.7 percent of seats prior to the elections.153
In terms of elections, the GNU instituted a triple-balloting system that required each
citizen to case three ballots at the district and sector level—general, women’s and youth.
This policy ensures that women received a set percentage of seats at both these levels; in
addition, women are able to run on the gender ballot, although it is more competitive.154
Finally, the new Rwandan Constitution, drafted in 2003, requires that 30 percent of seats
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“in Parliament and all other decision-making bodies” be set aside for women.155 This
codification of Rwanda’s commitment to women’s role in government contrasts starkly
with the extremely low rates of women’s participations prior to the genocide.
In addition, these initiatives—coupled with the increasing visibility and respect
afforded women—have resulted in levels of participation beyond legislative
requirements. For example, 48.8 percent of the members of parliament (MPs) in 2008
were women—the highest rate in the world156 Following the 2008 elections, Rwanda
became the first country in history in which women outnumber men in parliament,
comprising 56 percent. 157 In addition, women currently make up one-third of all cabinet
positions, the chief of the Supreme Court is a woman and Dr. Rose Mukantabana was
voted the first female speaker of parliament in 2008.158 The electoral success of women
may be explained, at least in part, by the perception that women are less prone to
corruption than men and more likely to provide services, an attitude espoused by both
Rwandan men and women.159 Female MPs have also taken the initiative to create a crossparty caucus, also a first in Rwandan history. This Forum of Women Parliamentarians
reviews laws to ensure gender quality and conducts trainings for women’s groups
regarding their legal rights.160 Formed shortly after the genocide, this collaboration
between women—regardless of ethnic group or background—was seen as symbolic
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reconciliation: it has since inspired Rwandan MPs to create two other cross-party
caucuses on population issues and regional peace.161
Considered together, both the GNU’s rhetorical commitment and the reality of
Rwandan government demonstrate a high level of participation and representation of
women. By involving women to an unprecedented degree, women’s concerns have been
more directly integrated into policy and legislation. Further, the visibility of women
leaders throughout all levels of government can be seen as an inspiration to other
Rwandan women, broadening their perception of what it is possible for women in society
to achieve. However, despite the democratic participation of under-represented groups
such as women and youth, it must be noted the Rwandan state currently maintains some
authoritarian characteristics—including limits on freedom of speech and of press.162
Further, gender quotas do not necessarily guarantee meaningful participation for women;
however, that Rwandan women continued to be elected in numbers exceeding the
constitutional requirement indicates that values of gender equality are becoming socially
ingrained—providing hope that women’s meaningful participation will move Rwanda
towards a genuine democracy in the long-run.

3. Accountability for Gender Crimes: MODERATE
Throughout the genocide, sexual violence against women—predominantly directed
against Tutsi women—occurred across Rwanda. This sexual violence was not confined to
raping women in private: often women were raped on the street, held as sexual slaves for
the purposes of rape, subjected to multiple gang rape, or raped to death using sharp
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objects.163 This systematic rape was not limited to mature Tutsi women, but also included
elderly women and young girls.164 While beyond the scope of any experienced before,
physical and sexual violence against women was common prior to the genocide.165
However, the targeting of Tutsi women and their subjection to extreme forms of sexual
violence and humiliation were deliberate components of the genocidal agenda. The
motivation for this stemmed from the period of Tutsi dominance, during which strong
Hutu resentment regarding their ethnic inequality grew. Concurrently, however, a
mythology regarding the beauty and desirability of Tutsi women was also created—they
were perceived as “objects of desire” or as “trophies to be acquired,” either by rape or
through marriage.166 Despite discrimination against Tutsis, Hutus frequently married
Tutsi women as a confirmation of their status; intermarriages based on romantic were
also not considered outside the norm.167 However, under Habyarimana’s regime,
propaganda regarding the dangerous sexuality of Tutsi women proliferated—the Hutu
Ten Commandments, a pre-genocide document published by Hutu extremists, went so far
as to forbid Hutus from marrying Tutsi women to ensure the ethnic purity of children.168
A rhetoric of punishment followed, with the Hutu extremist media proclaiming Tutsi
women as deserving of rape as a means of revenge; further, many of the poor men
recruited into the military used the genocide as an opportunity to rape Tutsi women,
allowing them access to the previously unobtainable.
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Given the scope of the sexual violence perpetrated during the genocide, and the
psychological trauma Rwandan women still endure, the need for accountability was
paramount. Both the Rwandan government and the international community
acknowledged this need: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), set up
in Arusha, Tanzania to prosecute the most serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed during the genocide, includes rape as one of the crimes
prosecutable under international law.169 The ICTR expanded this definition during the
prosecution of Jean-Paul Akayesu, widely consider to be “the most progressive judgment
on gender ever pronounced by an international judicial body.”170 Akayesu, a Hutu, was
mayor of the Taba commune during the genocide. He was accused having knowledge of,
facilitating and encouraging the commission of sexual violence, along with beating and
murders of Tutsis.171 His trial included extensive testimony regarding rape and other
forms of sexual violence: the Akayesu trial was the first to try and convict a defendant for
the crime of genocide and the first to include sexual violence as an integral part of the
genocide—Akayesu received 15 years for rape, a charge upheld on appeal.172 This
landmark conviction also established a precedent for rape to be defined as a crime against
humanity.173 This precedent, in addition to the focus on sexual violence at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, was used by international women’s rights
advocates to influence the International Criminal Court during its construction—the ICC
now officially recognizes “rape, sexual slavery and forced prostitution, pregnancy and
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sterilization as well as other forms of sexual violence as crimes against humanity and war
crimes.”174
Apart from this groundbreaking case, which has had implications for women
worldwide, the ICTR’s record for accountability regarding sexual crimes is mixed. As of
May 2004, the ICTR had adjudicated one-third of their caseload, for a total of 21
judgments—18 convictions and 3 acquittals. However, despite the Akayesu precedent, 90
percent of those judgments contained no rape convictions.175 Of the 30 percent of cases
that included rape charges, only 10 percent have resulted in convictions. Given the
widespread sexual violence perpetrated during genocide, these numbers cannot accurately
reflect the participation of these defendants; however, the large number of acquittals have
been attributed to the prosecutor not “properly presenting the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt,” rather than the innocence of the accused.176 Thus, the Prosecutor’s
Office has not consistently incorporated crimes of sexual violence into their
investigations—failing the thousands of women who were victimized. Still,
approximately half the cases that will ultimately come before the ICTR will contain
allegations of sexual violence.177 And certain prosecutors—Louise Arbour, who served
from 1996 until 1999—have demonstrated a strong commitment to delivering justices for
crimes of sexual violence. For example, under Arbour, sexual violence amendments were
added to many cases; further, by her final year, all new indictments contained charges of
sexual violence.178 Unfortunately, the momentum gained during her term has now been
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maintained by subsequent ICTR Prosecutors—as a result, the number of convictions for
sexual violence has been inconsistent and infrequent.
In terms of accountability for crimes against women, Rwanda and the ICTR have
demonstrated an unprecedented awareness of the gendered dimensions of conflict.
Further, the Akayesu conviction acknowledged sexual crimes as paramount to crimes
against humanity—deserving of an equally severe punishment. That sexual crimes were
considered “Category I” offenses, too grave to domestic trial, also demonstrates a degree
of accountability to women. However, the reality has not fully built on the Akayesu
precedent, with too few cases containing charges of rape or resulting in convictions for
sexual crimes. Considered in totality, accountability for gender crimes in the aftermath of
the Rwandan genocide can be categorized as moderate—while rhetoric of support exists,
and some progress has been made, the reality does not yet match the justice that Rwandan
women expect and rightfully deserve.

4. Participation of Women’s Organizations: HIGH
In the aftermath of genocide, Rwanda experienced a proliferation in women’s
organizations, which played a formative role in rebuilding the country—both socially and
physically. As discussed in the context of the Rwandan Civil War, women’s associations
did exist prior to the genocide; however, these were generally small organizations with
limited impact. Following the genocide, the number of these organizations drastically
increased—a 1997 study estimated that in each of Rwanda’s 154 communes, there were
on average 100 women’s associations, for a total of more than 15,400 women’s groups.179
This can be compared to the total of 143 women’s NGOs identified in a 1986
179
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countrywide survey. Further, women’s organizations functioning prior to the genocide
resumed their activities, often incorporating the maintanence of peace into their
agendas.180 Due in part to necessity and an influx of international support, this explosion
in itself attests to the significant role of women’s organizations during this crucial period.
While the identification and analysis of each of these organizations is clearly outside the
scope of this paper, the following section will address the main purposes of the
organizations—making reference to relevant examples.
With such an abundance of groups, the scope and range of their activities is
necessarily diverse. However, most of these groups formed—or expanded their
activities—to meet the needs of the population when the state lacked the resources to do
so. These organizations also directly addressed the need to maintain the stable peace
attained following RPF’s military victory. Pro-Femmes/Twese Hamwe, a collective of
women’s organizations at the national level, jointly created the post-genocide Campaign
for Peace. Through promotion of the program, women’s groups in Pro-Femmes directly
contributed to discussions with the GNU, international actors and other Rwandan
organizations on how to sustain peace and target relief efforts to women.181 The four
main goals of the Campaign for Peace were: encouragement of a culture of peace,
combating gender discrimination, promoting socioeconomic reconstruction, and
reinforcing the institutional capacity of the organization. Motivated by these concerns,
the Campaign for Peace engaged in a spectrum of activities, ranging from aiding in
mediation and negotiations to organizing trainings for women on issues such as legal

180
181

Baines, p. 225.
Newbury and Baldwin, p. 104.

Mary McCarthy | 81

rights or income generation.182 Implicitly, this interethnic collaboration also contributed
to healing, as victims and perpetrators identified common problems and worked together
towards solutions. As a result of Pro-Femmes contributions, the umbrella organization
received the UNESCO-Mandanjeet Singh Prize for the Promotion of Tolerance and NonViolence in 1996.183
At the grassroots level, Burnet (2008) found that women’s organizations “filled a
social void,” by helping to meet the basic needs of Rwandan women—and men—and
creating new support systems to replace those destroyed during the genocide. An
example of organizations providing support include the Association of the Widows of
Rwanda (AVEGA), which was created in the aftermath of the conflict to provide
financial and emotional support to genocide widows—one of the most vulnerable groups
in the population.184 AVEGA imbues these women with a greater degree of social power
and allows for international aid to be efficiently channeled to their aid. Because the
Rwandan economy was destroyed during the conflict, and many individuals had lost their
livelihoods or the income-generating members of their families, economic support was
particularly crucial during this timeframe. Numerous women’s organizations realized this
and thus formed organizations to facilitate micro-loans and grants to Rwandan citizens.
For instance, Duteriembre, a female micro-lending cooperation, provided genocide
widows with capital to start new businesses, while the Women in Transition program
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made small grants to needy citizens, bolstered by $3 million of USAID emergency
assistance.185
Women’s organizations at this time greatly contributed to the stability of Rwandan
society through their provision of economic assistance and basic needs. Because the
organizations functioned at both the local and national levels, they were particularly
effective at identifying those in need and ensuring that their services reached them.
Newbury and Baldwin (2001) conducted a thorough analysis of post-genocide women’s
organizations, cataloging the many activities they engaged in. A basic outline of their
findings follows: Women’s organizations addressing rural poverty, a root cause of
tensions due to inequality, by building shelters and providing livestock. They engaged
advocacy work, promoting women’s—and human—rights and providing legal services to
those in need. Women’s associations also provided vocational training and civic
education, helping to reintegrate former combatants and to impart useful skills to
unemployed women. In addition, the public health system in Rwanda was almost
nonsexist following the genocide, so numerous women’s organizations have addressed
health concerns through promoting policy changes and providing direct medical care—
such as setting up clinics to serve the victims of sexual violence or opening pharmacies in
rural areas.186 All of these initiatives have been integral in providing support for a
traumatized population and also in promoting stability and rebuilding infrastructure; in
doing so, women’s organizations can be seem as promoting peace at the ground level.
Because the Rwandan genocide, while intense, was brief and ended by means of a
military victory, women’s organizations were not actively involved in the peacemaking
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process. However, these organizations provided the majority of social services following
the genocide, helping to address its root causes, and have undertaken campaigns to
educate the population and prevent such a tragedy from ever reoccurring. Thus, the rapid
proliferation and expansive scope of women’s organizations discussed above demonstrate
that their participation was undeniably high during the peacebuilding process of postconflict Rwanda.

iii. Peace Outcome: Success
Motivated by the brutality and widespread violence that occurred during the Rwandan
genocide, the country has since demonstrated a clear commitment to peacebuilding.
Although the government has been tangentially involved in the First and Second Congo
War, Rwanda proper has exhibited a consistent level of stability. Over a decade since the
conflict, Rwanda has maintained peace and continues to progress towards a more
integrated, democratic society. Following the genocide, the country’s flag, anthem and
constitution were all replaced to promote unity and remove traces of ethnic
discrimination. In addition, the country has joined both the East African Community and
the Commonwealth of Nations to promote stability and growth within the region.
Though the government maintains vestiges of an authoritarian regime, Rwandans
have been participating in elections at all levels since 2003—with female candidates
experiencing unprecedented success even in the national parliament. Further, while the
economy suffered during the civil war and genocide, it has experienced substantial
growth in recent years, between 6 and 7 percent annually, and the Rwandan government
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has made considerable progress towards rehabilitation.187 Many Rwandans still live
below the poverty line, but progress has also been made in the areas of education and life
expectancy: 70 percent of the population is now literate, compared to 58 percent prior to
the genocide, and life expectancy is now 52 years.188 Most tellingly, Rwanda’s Human
Development Index—a statistic based on a country’s life expectancy, education and percapita GNI—rose by 3.3% during the past decade.189 This represents the largest increase
of any country in this time period. Ultimately, the effects of the genocide continue to
linger—including ethnic tensions—but Rwanda has remained peaceable despite
numerous potential spoilers. While the substantial participation of women, particularly in
government and civil society, cannot be regarded as independently responsible for this
successful outcome, the above sections demonstrate plausible avenues through which
women have directly promoted and sustained this peace.

QuickTime™ and a
decompressor
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3. Liberia’s First Civil War: 1989—1996
i. Conflict Background
Unique among African countries, Liberia is one of two African nations without a
colonial history—making it the continent’s oldest republic. Freed American slaves settled
along the West African coast, founding the country in 1847; prior to their arrival, sixteen
main ethnic groups, who still reside there today, inhabited the region. Despite comprising
only five percent of the population, the Americo-Liberians created an oligarchy, ruling
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over the majority of the population for more than a century.190 Although Liberia appeared
prosperous and stable, this exclusionary rule created deep-seated resentment and
instability within the population. In 1980, the military staged a coup d’etat, replacing
President Tolbert with Samuel Doe, the first Liberian President not of Americo-Liberian
descent.191 Instead of initiating democratization, Doe established a military regime, the
People’s Redemption Council, with the support of indigenous tribes who had long been
excluded from political participation.192 Elections were held in 1995; however, they were
widely regarded as fraudulent and President Doe remained in power, continuing to
preferentially favor the Krahn, his own ethnic group.
In response to Doe’s brutal and inept rule, a failed coup-attempt was undertaken later
that year—in retaliation, Doe ordered a crackdown in Nimba County, resulting in the
indiscriminate killing of more than 3,000 Gios and Manos and the destruction of their
homes.193 As it was predominantly Gios and Manos that had orchestrated the coup, this
rampage only increased ethnic tensions. Despite this resentment, Doe’s regime
prevailed—in part because of financial and political support from the United States,
which feared Liberia might fall into the Soviet camp.194 With the end of the Cold War in
1989, this support was quickly withdrawn, destabilizing the Liberian economy and
creating a security vacuum.195
Charles Taylor, a former member of Doe’s government, quickly capitalized on this
opportunity. Taylor had relocated to the Ivory Coast and assembled a rebel group,
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composed mainly of discontented Gios and Manos, which came to be known as the
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). On December 24, 1989, the NPFL crossed
into Liberia to overthrow Doe’s regime; the government’s Armed Forces of Liberia
(AFL) retaliated but were unable to contain the insurgency—beginning the First Liberian
Civil War. Due to the Nimba massacre, the NPFL was easily able to recruit members and
continued their march toward the capital, Monrovia.196 In the course of this fighting,
Doe’s undisciplined army attacked citizens and burned villages within the territory of the
Gios and Manos. A particularly brutal incident occurred in July 1990, when AFL soldiers
murdered over 600 civilians, including Charles Taylor’s father, who had taken shelter in
a church.197 Also during this time, Prince Johnson—a former NPFL rebel—formed his
own guerilla force, comprised predominately of Gios, called the Independent National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL).198
In August 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
decided to deploy a military intervention force—the Economic Community Monitoring
Group (ECOMOG)—to establish a ceasefire and prevent the conflict from spilling over
into neighboring states.199 The following month, the INPFL was able to capture President
Doe—who was then tortured and killed.200 Between 1990 and 1994, both Taylor and
Johnson claimed power; thus, their forces continued to fight, despite signing more than
ten peace agreements brokered by ECOWAS during the four-year interval. The conflict
was further complicated by the formation of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia
for Democracy (ULIMO) in June 1991, which was comprised of former supports of
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President Doe and former members of the Armed Forces of Liberia.201 In the course of
fighting, all of these rebels groups committed gross human rights violations, murdering
and raping thousands of civilians.
Finally, in August of 1995, leaders of seven armed factions signed the Abuja Peace
Agreement: the thirteenth peace agreement of the conflict, it established a power-sharing
government comprised of a ruling six-member council that incorporated the leaders of the
three largest factions. Under this agreement, Charles Taylor, Alhaji Kromah and Dr.
George Boley would share power equally with civilian representatives holding the other
three positions.202 However, renewed fighting across the country began in the following
months. The fighting was ended by the updated Abuja Accord, signed in Nigeria in 1996,
which again incorporated the main warlords—providing them with both amnesty and
power—and established a timetable for DDR and elections in the following year.203 In
July 1997, elections for the presidency and national assembly were held—Charles Taylor
and his National Patriotic Party enjoyed an overwhelming victory; Taylor received 75
percent of the vote while current Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf followed with
less than 10 percent.204 Although the country entered into a period of peace, the civil war
had decimated country’s population, economy and infrastructure: at least 200,000
civilians, or one-tenth of Liberia’s population, had been killed—and almost one million
Liberians had become refugees in neighboring countries with another one million
displaced internally.205
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ii. Women’s Participation: Substantial
1. Women and the DDR Process: LOW
As a requirement for peace, the second Abuja Accord called for the disarmament and
demobilization of all insurgent groups by 1997. Because of the number of these groups,
the DDRR process undertaken (disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and
reconciliation) was seen as particularly crucial to preventing a reoccurrence of armed
conflict. The 1996 DDRR program involved three stages: during the first stage, fighters
were disarmed, registered and counseled. In the second stage, these disarmed combatants
were drawn into work and training programs to gain marketable skills. Finally, the excombatants were reintegrated, a long-term process that involved food rations and tools
for work.206 By February 1997, about 24,5000 of the estimated 33,000 fights (or 74
percent) had been disarmed and demobilized. This group included 4,306 child soldiers
and only 250 adult female fights.207 It is important to note that child soldiers were the
primary fighters in the first phase of the conflict—accounting for 15,000 to 20,000 of the
soldiers between the six major armed factions, of which girls significant proportion.208
However, the DDRR program did not collect gender-disaggregated data, making it
difficult to separately analyze the program experiences for female child fighters;
regardless, Liberia’s DDRR program managed to involve only a small percentage of
child soldiers—both boys and girls—in the process.209
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Women were also involved with the fighting, participating as direct combatants and
as women associated with fighting forces (WAFF), who voluntarily or involuntarily
provided logistical support and resources to the rebel groups. This support included
preparing food, cleaning camps, and fetching water; the women and girls were also
frequently used as sexual slaves or forced into marriage.210 Although the exact number of
female combatants for the first conflict is not known, women and girls comprised 30-40%
of all fighter forces, or approximately 25,000 to 30,000 participants, between 1989 and
2003. While more women voluntarily participated in the second conflict, the number that
joined or that were forced to participate during the first conflict was still substantial.211
For example, Charles Taylor’s NPLF included a female artillery unit, and numerous
women achieved the rank of “general” within all of the warring factions.212 Thus, the
demobilization of only 250 adult female fighters does approach the number of women
that participated in the conflict. Additionally, less than one percent of female child
soldiers were incorporated into the DDR program.213
These low numbers reflect the extent to which women and girl combatants were
excluded from the program. This marginalization is further evidenced by the lack of
specialized initiatives for women and or girl child soldiers, creating a system in which
“their needs and particular circumstances were not adequately considered.”214 Because
many of the women and girls experienced sexual violence during combat, an effective
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DDR program would have provided psychological counseling and also anticipated the
social stigma they may have faced during the integration process. Further, a U.S. Institute
of Peace report in 2008 found that women soldiers are especially disadvantaged
economically post-conflict, making them twice as likely as men to rejoin insurgent
groups to avoid poverty.215 In the case of Liberia, the report found that almost 30 percent
of over a thousand former female fighters would be willing to return to fighting “to feed
their families and gain acceptance from their communities.”216 These numbers reflect the
importance of involving women and girl soldiers in the DDRR process—particularly
because, immediately following conflict, females were more useful to the factions then
men who could no longer fight. Women and girls continued to provide logistical support
for these groups, allowing their perpetuation and making it easier to revert to violence.217
Ultimately, the 1996 DDRR program exhibited an explicit focus on “one man, one
gun,” a rhetoric and strategy that resulted in the marginalization of a substantial—and
fundamental—part of many of the fighting forces.218 Women and children, particularly
girl soldiers, were mostly excluded from the process; even when incorporated, they did
not receive the extra support necessary to ensure their successful reintegration into
civilian life. Thus, women’s participation in DDRR is categorized as low; this exclusion
of women and children has been widely acknowledge as a major weakness of the first
DDRR attempt—the failure of which was partially responsible for the Second Liberian
Civil War.
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2. Women’s Political Participation: MODERATE
Prior to the conflict, Liberian women were the primary labor force responsible for
agricultural production, domestic work and child rearing; as a result of their gender, most
women were relegated to the domestic sphere and were expected to defer to male
authority.219 Among many of the ethnic groups, both female genital mutilation and
polygamy were common practice: male leaders would accumulate women and use them
to form advantageous political or economic alliances.220 Because of this male dominance,
women’s participation in the formal political sphere was uncommon; however, women
could enjoy positions of power in local hierarchies and a degree of legal rights, due to the
relatively progressive approach to women’s rights taken by the Americo-Liberians. From
the nineteenth century onward, Liberian women were legally able to buy and sell land,
enter into contracts and initiative divorces—although these rights were often
circumscribed in practice.221 In 1946, Liberian women gained suffrage, and during
President Tolbert’s time in power—from 1971 until 1980—eight women served as
government ministers.222 Thus, in many ways, Liberian women had a stronger foundation
than women in other African nations from which to increase their political participation.
This potential, however, was not fully realized: after the conflict, women shouldered
a disproportionate amount of financial and social responsibility, which was not matched
by an equal increase in their share of power. Because of the desperate situation, the main
focus of ECOWAS and other peacekeeping forces was on enacting a ceasefire and
preventing further death and destruction—this often meant catering to the priorities of the
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warlords. Nevertheless, women were not entirely excluded from formal political
participation. During the fighting, the Abuja Accord in 1995 had established a ruling
council of six members—three warlords and three civilians—led by civilian Wilton G.S.
Sankawulo. After a resurgence of violence, the second Abuja Accord called for a new
leader to be nominated and elected. In September 1996, Liberia became the first African
nation to have a female leader, with the inauguration of Ruth Perry—a former Senator
and activist in the women’s community— as the Head of the Council of State. As the
leader of the transitional government, Perry would serve until the elections in July 1997
and was tasked with overseeing them.223
However, the difficulty of Perry’s nomination and the limits of her power
demonstrate that this appointment was not a full victory for women. When Perry arrived
in Abuja, Nigeria, she was originally told that she had been refused accreditation as a
female candidate. Even after appealing to the Chief of Protocol, Perry was told “there
was nothing he could do.”224 Perry’s accreditation was granted only after considerable
pressure was placed on these men; ECOWAS then designated her as chairperson, with
the acceptance of all the faction leaders. Although Perry proved a proactive leader,
touring the country and drawing attention to human rights abuses—her power was
frequently undermined by the men on the Council. In a telling incident, Charles Taylor
missed Perry’s inauguration to travel instead to Tripoli, where he celebrated the twentyseventh anniversary of Muammar Qaddafi’s rise to power, publicly demonstrating a lack
of respect for Perry’s leadership.225 Later that year, Taylor also ordered that Perry make
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significant changes to her UN speech before he would approve funding for her trip to
New York; Perry made the changes, raising questions about the true balance of power in
the council.226
While Perry’s appointment represented a substantial achievement for Liberian
women, who had been marginalized from both their countries’ politics and its peace
process, her high profile position should not be conflated with full political participation
for all women, or even for Perry herself. Because of the overwhelming authority of armed
faction leaders, and the gender-bias in Liberia’s male-dominated society, many regarded
her appointment as a “cosmetic attempt” to dilute their power: despite her impressive
commitment, it was “clear that the warlords called the shots.”227, 228 Still, Perry’s role as
interim leader established an important precedent in Liberia, and in Africa at large; her
leadership also proved the most effective of any Head of Councils’ during the transitional
government—with successful Presidential and legislative elections held with her
oversight.
In lower levels of government, the degree women’s participation post-conflict was
also mixed. When the three warlords had to resign from the Council of State to run for
election in 1997, two of them—Taylor and Boley—chose female candidates to replace
them; thus, three of the six members on Ruth Perry’s Council were women.229 In the July
1997 elections, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf—an educated woman, prominent in Liberian
politics before her exile—became the first female contestant for presidential office in
African history; unfortunately, Johnson-Sirleaf was soundly defeated by Charles Taylor
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and would not become President until 2005. In addition, 15 women served as Ministers
during the interim regime and Charles Taylor’s time in office. Additionally, four women
served as Deputy Ministers and two as Assistant Ministers.230 The number of women
appointed to the legislative branch in 1997 is not available; however, after the 2005
elections, women made up 12 percent of the House of Representatives and 17 percent of
the Senate, the highest level of political representation by women in Liberia’s history.
Thus, the number of female representatives in 1997 was lower and certainly did not
constitute a substantial proportion of the legislature. Taken together, these numbers
reflect the marginal presence of women in Liberian politics, because—although their
representation increased somewhat at the national level—male representatives and their
interests considerably outweighed those of women.
Therefore, considered overall, women’s political participation increased in the postconflict period; however, their level of representation remained relatively low and even
Ruth Perry—a woman appointed to the country’s most powerful position—was limited in
by the male warlords in her faculties as Head of Council. Thus, women’s formal political
participation in Liberia at this time can be categorized as moderate, as women made some
progress but did not achieve substantial gains in the political realm.

3. Accountability for Gender Crimes: LOW
Although not on the scale witnessed during the Rwandan genocide, sexual violence
against women and girls was also prevalent during the First Liberian Civil War. While
the full extent of this violence is not known, a random sample of 205 women and girls
found that 49 percent had experienced at least one act of physical or sexual violence by a
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fighter: the women reported being bound, strip-searched, beaten and raped.231
Particularly towards the end of the conflict, the majority of rape victims were between the
ages of 40 and 65; because of the African tradition that older women view young men as
their sons, this form of sexual violence was particularly shameful and stigmatizing.232
Young girls, co-opted into the fighting forces, were particularly vulnerable to sexual
abuse due to their young age and small size—the majority of girl child soldiers were
forced into sexual servitude.233 The large number of female refugees also contributed to
widespread sexual violence, as these women were also vulnerable when they left their
communities and traveled to refugee camps—even in these camps, women were often not
protected or were raped by the men meant to guard them.234 Throughout the conflict,
many of these rapes resulted in unwanted pregnancies, with the women being forced to
bear and care for children fathered by their assailants. Forced sex also frequently resulted
in women contracting sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS—the rate of
which rose significantly among women post-conflict, with Liberia now having the third
highest rate of the disease in West Africa.235
The level of violence experienced by women, both sexual and in the course of the
conflict, undoubtedly resulted in both physical and psychological trauma. However,
despite the extent of sexual violence, little effort was made to hold the perpetrators
accountable. Neither of the Abuja Accords referenced sexual violence or justice for the
female victims; instead, all of the peace agreements were predicated on amnesty for the
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warlords and appeasement through placing them in positions of power. The complicity of
these men, particularly Charles Taylor, in promoting sexual crimes was undeniable: in
1993, a radio conversation between Taylor and his field commander was intercepted,
during which Taylor gave explicit instructions regarding civilian women—“as for the
women, rape them, to hell with them.”236 Liberia’s domestic laws also prevented women
from seeking justice: at that time, the Liberian penal code did not define rape as a
crime—only gang rape was prosecutable under the law.237 Because of the social stigma
surrounding rape, women were also reluctant to seek medical or psychological assistance
or to report the assault to the police.238 Neither Liberia’s existing legal structure nor the
transitional government made an effort to protect women from this sexual exploitation or
to prosecute the perpetrators, whether leaders or fighters.
In summation, the existing penal code did not provide avenues for women to achieve
justice after experiencing sexual violence. Further, the focus of negotiations was on
achieving a ceasefire and conducting elections—leaving out many women’s issues,
including acknowledgement of the violence they suffered or the creation of mechanisms
through which these crimes could be adjudicated. Therefore, accountability for crimes
against women following the war must be categorized as low.

4. Participation of Women’s Organizations: HIGH
Unlike Rwanda, the Liberian conflict ended as a result of a lengthy negotiations
process, which included numerous failed ceasefires and peace agreements. As such,
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women’s organizations were active both in the peace process and afterwards, in
attempting to stabilize the country and maintain the fragile peace. Numerous
organizations, at every level, were involved in these initiatives. Thus, this next section
will examine the role of women both in the peace process and in the subsequent
peacebuilding, making reference to relevant examples of the most influential
organizations.
In the first years of the war, the number of women’s organizations increased
exponentially—they existed at all levels of society and their members included both
educated, urban-based women and illiterate female farmers.239 These groups coalesced in
response to the chaos into which their country had descended: women began realized the
extent to which they and their children were victimized for the power gains of selfish
warlords and so they reacted. In this way, the war also forced many women to take on
new roles, because the males they had previously depended on were killed or absent due
to the conflict.240 Women’s organizations initially addressed the basic needs of the
population—providing food, building shelters and offering psychological counseling. For
example, women in SELF, the Special Emergency Life Food Programme, would befriend
fighters—who viewed them as relatively harmless—in order to deliver emergency relief
supplies to populations in occupied territories.241 Groups such as the United Muslim
Women’s Education and Day Care Center provided education for children displaced by
the conflict and homes for those who had been abandoned. The Feeding, Literacy and
Recreation Project was also started by women; in 1992 alone, this organization provided
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over 500 war-affected children with meals, trauma counseling and basic literacy
programs.242 Another incident in 1992 demonstrated women’s unique role in providing
support during conflict: ULIMO forces had blocked the main road from Gbarnga to
Monrovia, causing acute food shortages and mass starvation in the capital. The
Concerned Women’s Organization (CWO) mobilized women traders in both cities,
across faction lines, to gather food—then, risking their personal safety, they negotiated
passage with both the NPLF and ULIMO forces. The women negotiated more than 50
checkpoints, but eventually arrived in Monorovia and provided food to the needy
population.243
Women’s organizations primary role in relief provision allowed them to develop
contacts, and credibility, both regionally and internationally. Their success also prompted
further efforts within civil society to support the Liberian population and push for peace.
Women’s groups began to organize sessions on conflict resolution and reconciliation.
Starting in 1990 and continuing throughout the conflict, these sessions involved religious
leaders and professions from different factions. One of the women involved with this
initiative, Elizabeth Mulbah, recalls that on the first day the participants “did not want to
speak to each other,” but through the women’s effective mediation, by the fifth day they
were able to apologize, some even “were hugging and crying.”244 Efforts such as these
facilitated the reconciliation process, even in the course of war, and began to build trust
across previously divided communities. Women would also petition faction leaders
directly, as female traders had extensive contact with these leaders and their combatants
in the marketplace, to encourage them to enter into peace negotiations. Through this
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interaction, women’s groups began to establish trust with faction leaders—which would
allow them access to the warlords later in the movement.245 Because these women’s
organizations acted voluntary, and generally with very limited resources, the women
relied on their religious or professional affiliations, kinship ties and involvement in food
distribution and marketing chains as leverage for their cause and to ensure that the needs
of the population were met and the factions were aware of the impact the fighting was
having on civilians.246
Aside from providing relief and facilitating reconciliation—efforts that extended and
proliferated following the Abuja Accords—women’s organizations were also involved in
initiating the peace negotiations and petitioning for full disarmament. Because of their
extensive involvement in this process, its full scope of participation cannot be covered,
but a few of the women’s organizations major contributions will be discussed as well as
the general strategies they employed to pressure for peace. Starting in 1994, the Liberian
Women’s Initiative created a movement, rather than an organization, which strengthened
the women’s position: allowing them to collaborate with numerous sectors of the female
population, gain credibility and focus their demands for disarmament and conflict
resolution.247 LWI employed various strategies, such as working with religious and civic
groups to organize “stay-home” days during 1995 and 1996—these days paralyzed the
capital, as market places, government offices and businesses were closed. In addition to
demonstrating public support for negotiations, the success of these days also helped
women to develop solidarity. Other tactics included picketing places such as the United
State Embassy or the embassies of ECOWAS countries; the women used these protests,
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in addition to letters and faxes, to voice their support for complete disarmament prior to
creating a transitional government. However, their concerns were explicitly dismissed.
After meeting with ECOWAS Chairman Jerry Rawlings, the President of Ghana, he told
the women that immediate implementation of the transitional government was a
necessary risk.248
In response, women’s groups organized public demonstrations in March of 1994,
when the transitional government was formally founded, and continued to protest
throughout the year. These demonstrations and marches helped Liberian women to gain
public support and legitimacy—the high turnout, across ethnic and religious lines, made
it clear that the citizens of Liberia wanted peace and supported a full disarmament.249
Together, women’s organizations created the “Fund for Disarmament” to buy weapons
from combatants and destroy them; however, ECOMOG opposed this program and halted
its activity.250 Despite their strong actions and valid concerns, complete disarmament was
not achieved and the warlords were still placed in positions of power within the
transitional government, rather than being punished. As Amos Sawyer, the first head of
the interim government, reflected: “if disarmament had taken place back in 1994, as
indeed it should have, we probably wouldn’t have had April 6, 1996:” the day which war
came to Monrovia, resulting in one of the most brutal episodes of the conflict.251
In terms of attending peace negotiations, individual women attended many of the first
peace talks; however, this was a result of their personal access, such as political
affiliations, and not so that they could lobby for peace on behalf of the civilian
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population. From 1991 until 1993, women’s organizations were not recognized by the
United Nations or ECOWAS as participants or observers at the peace talks.252 In 1994,
women’s organizations first attempted to participate in official peace talks, employing the
strategy of “corridor lobbying” by waiting in the hallways to talk to negotiators as they
entered or exited the room on their breaks.253 Although originally excluded from the
conference, the women successfully attracted media attention to their cause—as a result,
they received “official participant status” on the third day of negotiations.254 For future
meetings, the women began to create position statements regarding the conflict and its
impact on women and their communities; however, the women’s organizations rarely had
the funding to attend negotiations held outside Liberia.
As a result, only three women were sent to Abuja, Nigeria to participate in the 1995
talks. Although originally denied the opportunity to present their petition paper, President
Rawlings eventually allowed the women to do so. This paper included details regarding
the effects of the conflict and recommendations for creating an environment suitable for
peace. The extensive news coverage of this presentation further solidified a precedent for
women’s participation in peace negotiations. Despite this major achievement, women
were still not invited to participate in a July 1995 meetings of leaders in Abuja.255 Finally,
in August 1996, women were extended a formal invitation to attend the Abuja talks—it
was at this meeting that Ruth Perry was appointed interim head of the transitional
government. Thus, women were active participants in achieving a working peace
agreement at Abuja II and in ending the First Liberian Civil War. As shown through this
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discussion, the participation of women’s organizations in both the peace process and in
providing basic relief during and after the conflict was undoubtedly high. However,
despite the achievements of this vibrant women’s movement, the same advantages
afforded to women by their gender—such as being perceived as neutral or less
threatening—also caused them to be consistently marginalized in formal negotiations
because of their femininity. Further, while women’s extensive participation contributed to
peace in the short-term, it was not enough to ensure that this peace would ultimately last.

iii. Peace Outcome: Failure
Having explained the rankings for women’s participation along the chosen four
dimensions of the peacebuilding process, the peace outcome of Liberia’s first civil war
must now be analyzed. Although the Abuja Accords were signed and, to a degree,
implemented—these conditions failed to prevent a relapse into violence. By holding
elections prior to fully disarming and demobilizing the warring factions, the peace in
Liberia proved particularly tenuous, despite the continued presence of ECOMOG to
monitor the ceasefire and transition to a democratic state. In 1999, only two years after
Charles Taylor was elected president, Liberia entered into a second civil war that would
last until 2003.
Because women did participate in both the political and civil spheres, this peace
failure is crucial for establishing the boundaries of their effect on sustainable peace. As
mentioned previously, women’s post-conflict participation was substantial relative to that
both of women in Liberian history and of women in African peacebuilding operations
more generally, so this case must be considered as a shift toward substantial participation.
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However, women were clearly not incorporated to the fullest extent possible—
demonstrated by the low rankings for the DDR process and accountability for sexual
violence. Further, Charles Taylor proved a powerful spoiler in the conflict, indicating that
women’s participation—including direct pressure on the spoiler—is not necessarily
effective enough independently to maintain peace. The vibrancy of women’s
organizations during this time did, however, provide a foundation for future women’s
movements in civil society. Thus, this conflict is important both as the foundation for and
a counterpoint to the later peace success, which was achieved with the help of many
women’s groups existent at this time and despite Taylor’s continued presence as a
spoiler.

4. Liberia’s Second Civil War: 1999—2003
i. Conflict Background
As per the Abuja Accords, elections were to be held in Liberia in 1997 to transition
to a permanent government. However, this quick push toward elections—without full
disarmament or stabilization of peace— essentially ensured that Charles Taylor would be
the only viable candidate. Taylor’s advantages included his unlimited access to funds,
amassed during the war, transportation and media; further, the majority of Liberian feared
a return to violence if he lost.256 Thus, in July 1997, Charles Taylor became president,
having been elected with a mandate of over 70 percent. Based on this mandate, Taylor
disregarded many of the conditions of the Abuja Accords and maintained his NPLF
forces as part of the Liberian military. Further, in the aftermath of the conflict, Liberia’s
256
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infrastructure was destroyed and millions were dead or displaced—creating conditions of
instability that were not addressed by Taylor’s government.
Given the unstable conditions and dissatisfaction with Taylor’s presidency, a new
rebel group—supported by the neighboring country of Guinea and composed mostly of
Mandingo and Krahn fighters—formed with the express goal of forcing President Taylor
out of office. This group, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
(LURD), led by Sekou Conneh, began low-intensity attacks on the northwestern portion
of Liberia in 1999. In response, the RUF—still loyal to Taylor—began to attack Guinea
from Liberia and Sierra Leone. Thus, Liberia had become entangled in a three-way
conflict with Sierra Leone and Guinea: both of these countries supported the LURD
while Taylor supported opposition factions in both countries. Throughout 2002, LURD
troops continued to advance through the country, engaging in “hit-and-run” raids and
marching towards Monrovia. Soon after, a second rebel group—the Movement for
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)—emerged in the south, supported by the Ivorian
government.
By the summer of 2003, the Liberian government controlled only a third of the
country, with LURD controlling the northern third and continuing to threaten the capital,
and MODEL controlling southern Liberia. The shelling of Monrovia and a resurgence of
violence in March 2003 led to regional and international pressure for peace negotiations.
In June 2003, ECOWAS convened a conference in Accra for ongoing peace talks. A
month later, the United States established the Joint Task Force Liberia, positioning a
navy amphibious group and marine unit abroad an American military ship off the coast of
Liberia, applying further pressure to Taylor’s regime. Finally, in August 2003, President
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Taylor resigned as part of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which
negotiated an end to the war. Taylor was taken into exile in Nigeria, while his VicePresident Moses Blah replaced him. In response, the rebels lifted their siege of Monrovia
and the nation began peacebuilding operations. To support demobilization efforts, the
United Nations deployed the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNIMOL), composed of
both military and civilian troops. On October 14, 2003, Moses Blah handed over power
to the National Transition Government of Liberia, which functioned until the 2005
elections.
Despite a brief respite from the fighting, Liberians essentially endured fourteen years
of prolonged conflict. Millions more were displaced in the second civil war, with
thousands of civilians murdered or raped. The conflict also decimated Liberia’s economy
and infrastructure: in 2003, the country was ranked 174th out of 175 countries on the UN
World Human Development Index, which measures health and living conditions— with
80 percent of Liberians living below the poverty line and unemployment rates over 90
percent.257 Given these extreme conditions, women had an opportunity to play a
prominent role in peacebuilding efforts across numerous dimensions. The specifics of this
participation will be discussed below.

ii. Women’s Participation: Substantial
1. Women and the DDR Process: HIGH
As previously mentioned, over the course of both Liberian conflicts, an estimated
25,000 to 30,000 women participated either as combatants or supporters of the armed
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factions. However, few female participants were incorporated into the initial DDR
process—and even more women took part in the second civil war. Thus, full
disarmament and reintegration was considered paramount, particularly after the failure to
do so in late 1990’s, which included an emphasis on female combatants and supporters.
Starting in 2003, Liberia undertook a comprehensive DDRR program—disarmament,
demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration—to ensure full compliance on the part of all
parties and to provide necessary support to ex-combatants.
This DDRR program was jointly initiated and implemented: it included UNIMIL, the
Government of Liberia (GOL), NGOs and other UN agencies. The first phase,
disarmament and demobilization, ended in 2004 after 103,019 LURD, MODEL and GOL
combatants had completed the program.258 Following this success, the second phase—
reinsertion and reintegration—was implemented and expanded to include the entire
country. These initiatives included formal education, vocational training and social
reintegration. In particular, social reintegration was facilitated by psycho-trauma
counseling and human rights education. The entire DDRR program formally ended in
October 2007, after the successful reintegration of 90,000 combatants.259
In comparison to the 250 adult female fighters involved in the initial DDR process
(accounting for 3.2% of all participants), this program included 22,370 women who were
disarmed and demobilized, account for 28% of all participants.260 This percentage far
more accurately reflects the number of females involved in the conflict; further, the
majority of female combatants were incorporated into the process—a significant
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improvement brought about by “serious attempts to involve women in the process.”261
Further, of the 10,972 children that were disarmed and demobilized, 2,740 of them were
girls; again, these numbers indicate a substantial increase in participation on the part of
girls and women in the DDRR program.262 This increase was due in large part to the
acknowledgement that many women and girls were involved with the fighting forces,
either by compulsion or voluntarily—an acknowledgement that had been lacking during
Liberia’s previous attempt at DDR. Following this realization, the DDRR program
specifically altered its eligibility criteria to allow non-fighting groups that accompanied
combatants—which were almost exclusively comprised of women and children—to
participate and obtain the same DDR benefits as combatants.263 As such, this Liberia
disarmament process was one of the most inclusive ever undertaken.
Through their participation in the DDR program, thousands of women were given the
opportunity to either gain a formal education, sponsored by the program, or to undergo
skills training. During this second phase, women were also given a small monthly stipend
and housed in training institutions, providing the support necessary for their transition
back into the civilian population.264 Although this program did incorporate a significant
number of women, those who were excluded had difficulty self-demobilizing because of
a lack of economic opportunities.265 Also, a number of female combatants were
manipulated by their commanders, being forced into sexual relationships in order to
obtain access to the DDR program.266 Overall, Liberia’s second DDRR program was not
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flawless—and did not fully consider the experiences of women both during the war and
after; however, the large number of female combatants and the expansion of eligibility
criteria specifically to include women and girls associated with fighting forces
demonstrate that women’s participation in this dimension was high.

2. Women’s Political Participation: MODERATE
Despite entrenched norms regarding male superiority and indigenous practices that
marginalized women’s positions in society, Liberia has paradoxically also placed women
into highly visible positions of political power in the past decades. As discussed above,
Ruth Perry was appointed as the interim head of the transitional government prior to the
1997 elections; further, women had served as senators, representatives and as government
ministers—although in small numbers—for some time. Following the 2003 Accra
Accords, women continued to make gains in the political sphere. Most notably, in 2005,
Liberia made African history by electing the first female president on the continent. Ellen
Sirleaf-Johnson was a Liberian political exile who had been a member of the Association
for Constitutional Democracy in Liberia under Samuel Doe’s regime—she was jailed for
a brief period time due to her participation in this activist organization.267 After fleeing to
the United States, Johnson-Sirleaf served as director of the UN Development Programme
Regional Bureau for Africa. Although she was beaten by Taylor in the 1997 elections—
being seen as out of touch with the Liberian population due to her time in the United
States—Sirleaf-John was the most educated, qualified candidate to run in the 2003
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elections, earning 59 percent of the vote.268 Since taking office in January 2006, SirleafJohnson has been committed to physical and emotionally rebuilding the country. In 2010,
Newsweek listed her as one of the ten best leaders in the world and she has received
several awards for her positive contributions to Liberia post-conflict.269 Unlike Ruth
Perry, President Sirleaf-Johnson has been able to exercise her executive powers without
infringement; further, she has been influential in working towards peace across the
African continent. Some of her most prominent achievements include lowering Liberia’s
external debt from 4.9 billion dollars in 2006 to 1.7 billion in 2010. Further, the state has
increased school enrollment by 50 percent, begun to produce and export numerous
resources and returned power and running water to its major urban centers.270 Thus, the
election of a woman to the country’s highest position of power demonstrates significant
progress for women in the political realm, building off the precedent set by Ruth Perry.
In addition to her other achievements, President Sirleaf-Johnson has professed a
commitment to improving the situation for women and girls. During her time as
president, she has nominated the first woman to serve as chief of the police force;
additionally, she has appointed women to 22 percent of the positions of her Cabinet—
including as ministers of Finance, Justice and Commerce.271 Further, Liberia is one of
nine countries worldwide to send a female ambassador to the United Nations. Despite
these large gains, women are severely underrepresented in the legislature and at the local
level of politics. In 2005, Liberia elected its highest number of women to the
legislature—women currently hold 8 out of 64 seats in the House of Representatives
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(12.5%) and 5 out of 30 seats in the Senate.272 While still demonstrating progress, these
numbers more clearly reflect the difficulties women face in entering formal politics. As
half the population, and prominent actors in civil society, Liberian women should have
significantly more of a presence within the government. Within the past year, measures
have been taken to address this oversight—in May 2010, a bill came before the Liberian
legislature proposing a quota of at least thirty percent representation for women in
national elected office and political parties. Further, the bill proposes the allocation of a
special fund by the government to incentive parties to meet this requirement. Although
clearly necessary, this bill, known as the Gender Equity in politics Act 2010, is still
facing strong opposition from many male representatives, who claim it is “discriminatory
and a violation of the Constitution.”273
Overall, women’s participation and representation in formal politics cannot be
considered as high because of the lack of women in the legislature and in local politics.
However, the special significance of having a woman serving in the country’s most
powerful position must be acknowledged. Sirleaf-Johnson’s high visibility, along with
her appointment of women to many crucial positions, represents true progress and offers
hoping for increasing participation by women in this realm. Ultimately though, based on
the mixed representation of women in different levels of politics, this case must be
classified as moderate participation.
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3. Accountability for Gender Crimes: MODERATE
The extent of sexual violence against women as described during the first phase of the
Liberian conflict continued into the second civil war—women were again frequently
raped or abducted to serve as sexual slaves. The complete lack of accountability for these
crimes allowed by the international community—in granting amnesty to the warlords—
and by Liberia’s lack of legal redress for rape has been somewhat addressed in this
second post-war period.
Unlike the Abuja negotiations, accountability for atrocities committed during the
conflict was discussed extensively in Accra in 2003. Thus, the Accra Comprehensive
Peace Agreement included the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC). Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission was launched in June 2006, with
a mandate to investigate gross human rights violations—including sexual violations.274
To ensure that gender-based violence was properly address, the Mandate of the TRC
commission also included a requirement that four of the nine commissioners be women;
it also makes reference to a policy of gender mainstreaming to ensure that women are
“fully represented and staffed at all levels of the TRC” and that “special mechanisms are
employed to handle women and children victims.”275 Further, the Accra Accords
included institutional reforms to ensure that perpetrators of the most serious crimes,
including extensive sexual violence, would be excluded from participating in and
benefiting from the DDR process.276
The TRC’s final report, issued in 2009, included a section dedicated to women and
the conflict. This report cited the low socio-political status of women, with the cultural
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perception of male superiority as contributing to their vulnerability throughout the
conflict.277 As such, it made recommendations to address not only the violence women
experienced during conflict, but also the root causes of that violence that continued in the
aftermath. Recommendations included a commitment to education for girls, full
economic development for women, and increased access to healthcare. Further, the TRC
recommended that state provided reparations to the women who suffered sexual violence,
including: receiving free medical services, trauma counseling, scholarships for the
children of women whose husbands had been killed, and individual reparations on a caseby-case basis by all women who testified to the TRC.278 Finally, the TRC called for the
punishment of warlords and faction leaders who initiated, encouraged or participated in
violence against women.279 As the TRC released these recommendations less than two
years ago, it remains to be seen whether they will be implemented and to what extent.
However, it is significant that the particular burden suffered by women during, and after,
the conflict was acknowledged and that the TRC called for justice and reparations for
these women victims.
As the Liberian TRC lacked punitive powers, the state also modified its existing
policy on rape: in 2005 the Liberian Rape Law was enacted. This law expanded the
definition of rape beyond that of gang rape, raised the age of consent and imposed longer
sentences for perpetrators.280 In a monumental case later that year, the Association of
Female Lawyers of Liberia (AFELL) successfully prosecuted the rapist of a 24-year-old
teacher. This represented the first time in Liberian history that a woman had brought

277

Truth and Reconciliation Comminssion, “Final Report “Women and the Conflict,” (2009), p. 81.
Ibid, p. 86.
279
Ibid, p. 91.
280
Isis-WICCE, p. 115.
278

Mary McCarthy | 113

charges against her aggressor for rape and succeeded in prosecuting him.281 Despite
improvements in women’s legal rights, incidences of rape continue at an alarming rate
and many of the victims are under the age of eighteen.282 As such, the Liberian Rape Law
represents an important improvement but such legislation alone is not enough to hold
accountable the perpetrators of this sexual violence either during the conflict or in current
times.
Overall, Liberia has made significant strides towards accountability for sexual
violence against women; however, despite the rhetoric and institutional reforms, the
number of cases of sexual violence and of perpetrators brought to justice falls far short of
the extent of this violence during the conflict. While the 2005 rape law allows women to
bring charges under Liberian domestic law, few women are able to exercise this legal
right due to existing social stigma or a lack of knowledge about their rights. The Liberian
government has widely dissemination a simplified version of this law, but knowledge
among women is still quite low.283 In sum, while Liberia’s capacity to respond to genderbased violence is slowly improving, these initiatives have not meaningfully increased
female victims’ abilities to seek justice within the judicial system. Therefore, the level of
accountability for sexual violence against women can be categorized as moderate,
representing an improvement from the past but not the fulfillment of the state’s obligation
to these women.
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4. Participation of Women’s Organizations: HIGH
During the First Liberian Civil War, women’s organizations gained significant
experience in mobilizing for peace and in providing services to support those peace
efforts. After the return to conflict in 1999, these women’s organizations continued their
movement for lasting stability; as before, these groups functioned at all levels of society
with a variety of specific goals. Thus, the following section will provide an overview of
women’s activity in civil society, making reference to particularly relevant examples.
Following Charles Taylor’s election, sporadic fighting occurred in 1997 and 1998,
followed by sustained conflict between the government and the rebel factions in 1999. It
should be noted that this continuation of violence was only possible because full
disarmament had not been achieved, a condition Liberian women had demanded prior to
installing a transitional government. Throughout this period, women’s organizations
continued to build on their momentum in civil society—working toward a sustainable
peace. In edition to existing domestic efforts, Liberian women also began to form
regional and international alliances, increasing both their resources and their leverage.
For example, the Mano River Union Women Peace Network (MARWOPNET) was
founded in May 2000: this organization included women from Liberia, Guinea and Sierra
Leone committed to a culture of peace.284 While MARWOPNET has undertaken a wide
variety of activities—including holding peace talks with women refugees in camps
through the three countries and advising ECOWAS concerning the effects of conflict on
civilians—their most significant contribution to attaining peace was their success in
convincing the leaders of their three countries to meet for regional peace talks. Having
recognized that the conflict had crossed borders, Liberian women met with President
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Taylor to present their arguments for negotiations. Following this meeting, Charles
Taylor agreed to recall the ambassadors of Sierra Leone and Guinea, whom he had
expelled; further, the three leaders met in Morocco in March 2002—although those talks
did not solving their continuing disagreements.285
In response to the Liberian government’s failure to halt the fighting, women’s
organizations again began to publicly demonstrate for peace, gaining media attention and
support for their cause. In particular, the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET)—
created in 2002—was integral increasing public pressure on Taylor’s government to enter
into negotiations. Soon after its creation, WIPNET coordinated an alliance between the
Liberian Muslim Women for Peace and the Christian Women’s Peace Initiative, the two
most active women’s groups.286 This alliance resulted in strong position statement
condemning the war and demanding an immediate ceasefire; to present this statement to
President Taylor, the women organized a rally on April 11, 2003.287 Although the
WIPNET women sent Taylor five different letters, the President did not attend the rally—
in which over two thousand Liberian women participated. Because of this lack of
response, the women began a non-violent sit-in protest in an unused airfield clear to the
center of Monrovia, which President Taylor passed by each day; they pledged to remain
there until Taylor agreed to their terms of peace.288 A few days later, over 2,500 Liberian
women organized themselves for a sit-in at the Liberian Parliament. This mass action on
the part of women resulted in President Taylor’s agreement to meet with the women at
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his Executive Mansion on April 23, 2003.289 On that day, over four thousand Liberian
women met with Taylor to describe the desperate situation of their fellow citizens and to
demand his leadership in achieving peace. As a direct result, President Taylor agreed to
meet with the rebel groups in exchange for the women moving off the airfield.290
For the peace talks in Accra, the women of WIPNET carried out lobbying activity to
maintain pressure on the process—such as marching on the United States Embassy and
the UN Offices to demand their intervention and contributing updates to the media.291
WIPNET women also continued to maintain a constant presence at the airfield. Inside the
negotiation hall, the Liberian women of MARWOPNET formally participated in the
peace talks, putting forth declarations and appealing to the international community to
intervene with a peacekeeping force.292 In part because of their appeals, international
pressure was increased—particularly by the United States as it placed naval ships off the
coast of Liberia—and President Taylor signed a ceasefire with LURD and MODEL in
June 2003. Because of their critical role in the mediations that follow, MARWOPNET
was included as one of the signatory witnesses to the final peace agreement on August
18th.293 In addition, MARWOPNET received the United Nations Prize in the Field of
Human Rights both for their “initiatives to restore peace and to ensure that women’s
voices are included at all levels of the decision-making process” and for their success in
“bringing the heads of states of their countries to the negotiating table in 2001 and as a
delegate, mediator and signatory to the Liberian peace talks.”294 Thus, women’s
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organizations were critical to the initiation of the negotiations and in ultimately achieving
a lasting peace agreement, due in large part to their ability to sustain mass action with
diverse groups of women that transcended differences of religion, ethnicity and class.
Once peace had been achieved in 2003, women’s organizations continued to play a
prominent role in reconciliation and reconstruction activities, both of which were
necessary to ensure the success of this tenuous peace. For example, the LWI began a
peace seminar, with women representatives traveling to various villages to speak with the
people, especially women, about how to reconcile and work together.295 Further, because
the country’s economy had been destroyed, many women’s groups responded by
incorporating communal economic development projects—such as building new schools
or constructing a community drainage system—into their work.296 In doing so, they
provided the much-needed social services that the state was unable to offer, especially in
rural areas. Women’s also organizations provided support to vulnerable sectors of the
population—particularly victimized women and children—through means such as finding
them living space or offering psychological counseling. Finally, under WIPNET’s
oversight, Liberian women also began the “Never Again” campaign—a watchful
movement dedicated to promoting good governance and eliminating corruption, which
were major underlying causes of the conflict—that still continues in Liberia today.297
Overall, these women’s groups significantly contributed to fostering reconciliation and
rebuilding the country following the second civil war. Because of their strong
involvement in both achieving a working peace agreement and in the resultant
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peacebuilding activities, the participation of women’s organizations for this case study is
demonstrably high.

iii. Peace Outcome: Success
Despite the terrible devastation brought on by two subsequent wars, Liberia has
remained stable throughout the past decade and shows signs of significant progress. The
persisting peace allowed for democratic elections—widely regarded as free and fair—to
be held, which brought President Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson to power. Following the
implementation of a democratically-elected government, many businesses that had fled
the country returned to Liberia.298 Although the country is still struggling economy, its
GDP has increased between 6-8 percent annually over the past few years.299 Also, while
only 15 percent of the adult population is employed in the formal sector, the employment
rates continues to drop—the government is currently working to increase jobs and
revitalize the economy. Further, many Liberians have found work in either agriculture or
the informal sector.300 In 2010, Liberia achieved its Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
Initiative completion point; thus, over 5 billion dollars in international debt was
permanently eliminated.301
Since 2003, Liberia has also risen eight ranks on the UNDP Human Development
Index, currently ranked 162nd out of 175 countries.302 Improvements in health have
contributed to a rise in life expectancy, which is now 57 years, and the country continues
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to rebuild infrastructure and its public health system. While progress has been gradual,
the continuation of peace has allowed Liberia to make consistent progress and to better
the lives of its citizens. In their 2010 annual report, Freedom House also noted that the
media environment was considerably more open than under Charles Taylor and that the
government does not restrict academic or religious freedom.303 Within the next year,
Liberia is expected to again hold successful democratic elections, demonstrating the
country’s ability to transfer power through non-violent means. Ultimately, Liberia still
faces considerable challenges in rebuilding its physical and economic infrastructure, and
overcoming the psychological trauma of fourteen years of conflict; however, it has
remained peaceable despite instability in the region and the lingering presence of
potential spoilers. Again, while the substantial participation of women—particularly in
civil society—cannot be regarded as solely respond for this successful outcome, the
above discussion has demonstrated numerous direction contributions made by women in
achieving and sustaining this peace. The following discussion will elaborate further on
the findings of the case studies and the conclusions that can be reasonably drawn
regarding women’s participation in peacebuilding.

VI. Discussion
Having presented the previous case studies, it necessary to consider the extent to
which women’s participation can be said to contribute to a successful peace outcome. As
shown in the case studies, women can and do participate along various dimensions both
in reaching peace agreements and in maintaining the peace thereafter—and this
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involvement can increase the likelihood that peace will last through a variety of
mechanisms. However, it is vital not to overstate women’s contributions to peace or to
misconstrue their involvement as making the difference. While it is difficult to quantify
this contribution, women’s role in achieving peace can be qualified and contextualized—
identifying the areas in which they play a more substantial role and dimensions in which
they need to be further incorporated.
Considering the previous case studies, it is clear that women often play a crucial
role in civil society—due in part to their frequent marginalization from more formal
spheres. In both cases of successful peace outcomes, the participation of women’s
organizations in civil society was high; however, women’s groups also played a
substantial role during the first Liberian conflict, which resulted in a peace failure. Taken
together, this indicates that high women’s participation is a necessary, not but sufficient,
condition for their having a marked impact on the peace process. The participation of
women in civil society is a general indicator that women see themselves as stakeholders
in the conflict and have taken a proactive role—thus, creating grassroots initiatives and
pressure for peace from the bottom-up. Further, participation in this realm provides
women with organizing experience, networking opportunities and a sense of
empowerment, all of which are necessary for achieving enough leverage to have a
noticeable impact at the national level in peacebuilding. However, the first Liberian
conflict demonstrates that the existence of numerous women’s organizations committed
to and mobilizing for peace is not enough in itself to ensure a successful peace outcome.
This is due in part to the complexity of achieving peace, and the numerous actors
necessarily involved; however, it also indicates that for women to have a significant
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impact on the peace process, they may need high participation along many dimensions—
a condition that was lacking in the first Liberia case. However, this participation was still
vital as a foundation for later women’s movements in civil society, which capitalized on
this momentum and also created wider networks—both domestically and regionally—to
further their push for peace.
In both success cases, the synergy between high women’s participation in civil
society and influential women in the formal government was also evident. Although both
Liberia cases had moderate political representation for women, the second case was
further along the spectrum of this representation—especially due to the number of highly
visible women in positions of powerful, particularly President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. An
involvement at such high levels of governments—or in such high numbers, as in the case
of Rwanda’s majority-female parliament—ensures that women’s needs will be taken
more into consideration, thus allowing the demands put forth by women in civil society
to more frequently incorporated. This was evident in the enactment of the Liberian Rape
Law in 2005, which was due in large part to pressure from women in civil society and
their work in making visible the widespread sexual violence faced by women. Another
telling example was seen in post-genocide Rwanda: customary law prohibited women
from inheriting land from their male relatives, contributing to a high degree of instability
in the aftermath due to the large number of widowed women who were thus rendered
homeless and without the economic means to support their family. Realizing this, several
women’s organizations lobbied for a revision in this discriminatory law. Members of the
women’s caucus heard and responded to these demands, working to revoke this law soon
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after.304 Efforts such as these demonstrate the reinforcing effects of having women active
in all parts of society: women at the local level can realize the critical needs of the
population and communicate these to women with the political power to enact change at
the policy level. In this instance, the new inheritance law was crucial in Rwanda’s longterm reconstruction as it provided the many female-headed households with a stable
home and land on which to subsistence farm for their family.
This synergy can also work to increase the number of women in power; for
example, Liberian women’s groups contributed to President Sirleaf-Johnson’s election
through voter registration drives and encouraging women to participate in the election.
Also, the current push from women in Liberian civil society for the implementation of a
gender quota for the government clearly demonstrates the ways in which public pressure
can potentially impact the representation of women in government. Further, the visibility
of prominent women’s groups—which give voice to the women and children victims of
the conflict—can create a greater awareness of the need for gender mainstreaming at all
levels, prompting governments to create ministries devoted to gender and women’s
issues, as seen in the Rwanda case. This inclusion allows for a more representative view
of the needs of the society, particularly those of vulnerable groups, and so creates a more
responsive, inclusive government—a key foundation for building democracy. Thus,
based on the case studies, a strong argument can be made for the mutual importance of
high levels of women’s participation in civil society and in government—increasing the
visibility of women’s issues and reinforcing the impact of their efforts for peacebuilding.
Outside of women’s participation in formal government and civil society, the
importance of a high degree of accountability for crimes against women post-conflict is
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more difficult to determine. In both success cases, there was a rhetoric of accountability
as well as a limited number of efforts to achieve this. However, given the scope of
violence, particularly sexual violence, against women during the conflict—neither of
these cases demonstrated more than a moderate level of accountability in practice. Thus,
post-conflict accountability to women does not appear to be a critical component of
women’s substantial contribution to peace. While there are numerous plausible avenues
by which this may contribute to peace outcomes, most notably by providing closure for
the thousands of victimized women and contributing to the country’s psychological and
social healing, this dimension does not measure a way in which women can directly
impact either peace negotiations or the following reconstruction. Still, the greater
attention paid to violence against women in the second Rwanda and Liberia indicate that
an increase in awareness and efforts for justice may serve as a signifier of more
widespread acknowledgement of the drastic effects of civil war on women and larger
efforts to address these needs in the aftermath. Although this dimension may not be as
critical to ensuring that women’s participation is substantial enough to impact the peace
process, it is equally as important in terms of moral justice. The extent of violence,
mostly sexual, against women perpetrated during civil wars requires an equally
consequential response—providing female victims with the opportunity for justice, the
necessary access the public health and psycho-social support for the traumas they have
endured. Such steps towards accountability can also highlight harmful norms of male
dominance within societies and represent a positive step toward eliminating the
underlying patriarchal ideology used to rationalize and sustain widespread violence
against women.
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The four cases studies above also demonstrate that the necessity of high levels of
women’s participation along a certain dimension may vary depending on the conflict.
This was shown most clearly in the involvement of women in the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration process. In both Rwanda cases, the involvement of
women in the formal fighting forces was low, although regular women did participate in
or facilitate the genocidal killings that occurred. However, compared to the substantial
number of female combatants and women associated with the fighting forces in each of
the Liberian conflicts, both the low and the moderate levels of women’s involvement in
the Rwandan cases is less relevant to the overall contributions made by women. In the
case of Liberia, the shift from moderate to high participation in the 2003 DDR programs
is far more indicative of a changing attitude regarding women’s participation in the
conflict and the necessity of involving the significant number of female combatants to
ensure that full disarmament occurred and a relapse into violence was thus difficult in
comparison to the incomplete demobilization that occurred in 1996. Because the
calculation to include women in such programs is inevitably correlated with the number
of women participating in the conflict, high levels of involvement are not necessary for
every conflict. However, the creation of a DDR program responsive to the needs of
female ex-combatants—even when their levels of participation were low—can also
signify a broader commitment to gender mainstreaming, as in the case of Rwanda
following the genocide. Thus, the findings concerning this dimension demonstrate that
high levels of women’s participation may not be equally important across all aspects of
the peacebuilding process, as was also found in terms of accountability for violence
against women. Regardless, attentiveness to these areas can indicate a society in which
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women’s influence is substantial enough to ensure the their needs are addressed at all
levels, even when these could easily be disregarded.
A final element affecting all case studies must also be mentioned—the changing
international norms surrounding women’s participation in both civil war and in peace.
These case studies have been presented in chronological order with regard to when a
potential peace was first achieved—from 1990 in Rwanda’s civil war to 2003 in Liberia’s
second conflict. During this time, significant international legislative frameworks were
undertaken to assist women in their pursuit of equality. These include the UNSC
Resolution 1325 (2000), discussed above, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human
and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003), and the Southern African
Development Community Declaration on Women and Development (1997).305 All of
these indicate an increasing commitment to gender mainstreaming within the
international community and a wider recognition of the impact of conflict on women and
children. Further, Resolution 1325 affirmed the positive role that women can play in
conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding. Thus, there appears to be a positive
trend in international ideology—as well as indicated in the case studies above—that
women’s multi-faceted roles as both the sufferers of conflict and as potential rebuilders is
being acknowledged in rhetoric and, increasingly, in practice.
Overall, the four cases studies above measured women’s participation across four
dimensions of peacebuilding. However, in reality, this participation spans multiple
dimensions that are likely mutually reinforcing. Therefore, women’s potential
contributions should not be reduced to those discussed above, although the case studies
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indicate that substantial participation on the part of women—particularly high levels of
women’s involvement in both civil society and in formal government—contributes
positively to peace efforts. It is important to not overstatement this claim: process of
achieving sustainable peace is complex and context-dependant; further, it involves a
variety of actors including important political and military leaders, elements of civil
society and international actors. Thus, this paper does not argue that women’s
participation should be considered as the crucial element in successful peacebuilding, but
that to understate their contributions is also taking a position—one detrimental to the
attainment of peace. Women are equally as capable of constructive participation in peace
negotiations and in the following reconstruction process as men, and so their continued
marginalization denies peacebuilders fifty percent of their potential resources for problem
solving and for creating change at every level. Thus, without essentializing women’s
participation as the deciding variable, this paper concludes that women’s participation
does have a positive impact on achieving lasting peace, and that the more substantial the
women’s participation—particularly in civil society groups and in the formal
government—the greater the potential for their contributions.

VII. Conclusion
The proliferation of intrastate conflict following the end of the Cold War has
greatly altered the impacts of war on women—increasingly, it is civilian women who
suffer the most both in terms of violence and loss of livelihood due to these conflicts.
Further, although women are rarely the ones instigating such violence, they often
shoulder a disproportionate amount of responsibility in the aftermath without a
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concurrent increase in their power within society. There are a number of reasons why
women continue to be under-represented in decision-making positions, including
patriarchal practices, high levels of illiteracy and unequal work burdens. However, the
case studies above have demonstrated that substantial participation on the part of
women—along various dimensions of the peacebuilding process—can positively
contribute to both achieving and sustaining peace. In addition, increased involvement on
the part of women ensures a greater awareness and responsiveness to their particular
needs post-conflict—a necessary condition for rebuilding a stable state, as women
constitute half the population and are often responsible for the care of numerous family
members.
The findings of this paper suggest that every attempt should be made to encourage
women’s participation in the peacebuilding process, particularly within civil society and
the formal government. While this can be accomplished through a variety of means and
requires a commitment to gender mainstreaming on all levels, it is particularly important
to address the structural problems that exclude women from the negotiations realm. In
particular, peace negotiators are generally political and military leaders, positions that
women are unable to obtain. Thus, creating mechanisms to ensure women’s political
participation—such as instituting gender quotas—is a positive step toward equality both
in government and at the negotiations table. Further, women frequently assert their
peacebuilding power by creating structures outside of the political realm, such as NGOs,
or by lobbying leaders for their voices to be heard. The international community should
support such women’s initiatives, both logistically and financially, to ensure that women
are able to fully exercise their power within civil society. Finally, the international
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community should also ensure that all peace agreements are attentive to the particular
needs of women and that opportunities for their involvement continue throughout the
peacebuilding process. Although not an extensive list, the implementation of these
recommendations in future conflict situations would provide a solid foundation for
guaranteeing women’s equal participation.
Overall, this paper has demonstrated that substantial participation on the part of
women, while hard to quantify, has a positive impact on the creation and sustainability of
peace in post-conflict societies. In particular, the efforts of women in government and
civil society can have a synergistic effect, amplifying their efforts and substantially
increasing their effectiveness as peacebuilders. Ultimately, women’s significant
participation should not be seen as making the difference in achieving peace; however,
this involvement does make a difference and every effort should be made to ensure that
their significant capabilities are channeled toward peace and that the society created postconflict is both equitable and accountable to women for the losses they have suffered in
the course of war. The inclusion and empowerment of women, thus, should not be
viewed as idealism but as a pragmatic and effective step toward increasing the probability
of a successful peace outcome in the aftermath of violent conflict.
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